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I. INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court long has deemed a few categories of speech so
harmful and so lacking in value' as to be unworthy of First
1. Because neither history nor text offer much insight regarding the meaning and scope of
the First Amendment's free speech protections, scholars and courts tend to rely on theories of free
speech value. That is, they rely on varying theories about the value that inheres in free speech to
deduce the scope of free speech protections. See generally ERWIN CHEMERJNSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: PRINcIPALS AND PoLIcEs § 11.1.1 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing the difficulty in ascertaining the
framers' intent regarding the meaning of the First Amendment); Martin H. Redish, The Value of
Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 591, 595 n.27 (1982) [hereinafter Redish, Value of Free
Speech] (discussing the lack of a unified theory of free speech value). Theories of free speech value 2
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss4/2
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Amendment protection.2 Under this approach, which this Article calls
categorization doctrine, legislatures may regulate-even ban-unprotected
speech categories in their entirety.3 Specifically, legislatures may pass laws
punishing all speech within the following categories: threats,4 fighting
words,5 obscenity,6 child pornography,7 and speech that imminently incites
illegal activity.8
Because of categorization doctrine, one might reasonably assume that
legislatures can choose either to regulate all speech within an unprotected
speech category, e.g., by imposing a ban on all threats, or instead to
regulate subcategories of such speech, e.g., by banning only race-based
threats or threats that relate to terrorism. This assumption could stem from
a simple "greater includes lesser" rationale to the effect that the power to
regulate all threats must include the power to regulate some threats. Or it
could stem from the notion that the rationale that supports making a
category of speech "unprotected" supports making any subcategory of that
larger category "unprotected." Hence, if all threats are so lacking in value
or so harmful as to justify the withholding of First Amendment protection,
surely the same can be said of race-based threats or threats that relate to
terrorism.
These assumptions are as wrong descriptively as they seem reasonable
normatively. They are wrong descriptively because the Supreme Court has
made clear for over a decade that while legislatures constitutionally may
regulate unprotected speech categories in their entirety, it raises serious
constitutional concerns when legislatures single out only "content-based"

abound and can be divided roughly into "intrinsic" and "instrumental" theories. See, e.g.,
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 33 (1954); Thomas I. Emerson,
Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 878-79 (1963); Heidi
Kitrosser, From MarshallMcLuhan to Anthropomorphic Cows: Communicative Manner and the
FirstAmendment, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 1339, 1373-74 (2002) [hereinafter Kitrosser, From Marshall
McLuhan to Anthropomorphic Cows]. Intrinsic theories emphasize the intrinsic good of free speech
to the individual speaker, generally for reasons relating to dignity, self-fulfillment, or selfrealization. Kitrosser, From Marshall McLuhan to Anthropomorphic Cows, supra, at 1374.
Instrumental theories emphasize the instrumental role that free speech can play in improving
society, either as a general matter or in terms of its democratic governance processes. Id.
2. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358-59 (2003) (describing categories of
unprotected speech).
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969); Planned Parenthood v. Am.
Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
5. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
6. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973).
7. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-63 (1982).
8. by
See,
Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 447 (1969).
Published
UFe.g.,
LawBrandenburg
Scholarshipv. Repository,
2005
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subcategories of unprotected speech.9 In other words, serious
constitutional concerns arise when legislatures single out subcategories of
unprotected speech defined by viewpoint, subject matter, or
communicative impact."° Thus, while it is constitutionally unproblematic
for legislatures to ban all threats, serious constitutional problems arise
when legislatures ban only those threats that are based on race or that
relate to terrorism. While such restrictions are not per se unconstitutional,
they must pass challenging doctrinal tests to be upheld."
Despite the momentousness of the Supreme Court's conclusions that
unprotected speech is not fully unprotected and that content-based
regulations of such speech must pass tough doctrinal tests, the Court offers
only the barest of rationales for these conclusions. Specifically, the Court
suggests that content-based regulations of unprotected speech are
intrinsically troubling and that they cause instrumental problems by
skewing debate in the marketplace of ideas. 2 Put differently, the Court
applies the rationale for the content-distinction rule, whereby contentbased regulations of protected speech are deemed presumptively
unconstitutional for intrinsic and instrumental reasons, to the realm of
unprotected speech. 3 The problem with such application is that the
content-distinction rule is based largely on the premise that protected
speech is of significant intrinsic and instrumental value. 4 The rule does
not translate to the realm of unprotected speech if a major premise of
categorization doctrine is taken seriously. This premise is that unprotected
9. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1992).
10. Compare id. at 391 (deeming the St. Paul ordinance problematic because it regulates
based on subject matter and possibly viewpoint), with Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360-63
(2003) (subjecting a cross-burning statute to R.A. V's standards because it regulates based on the
use of a particular communicative symbol). Of course, the definition of "content" is far from clear,
although it typically is deemed to include at least viewpoint and subject matter, and sometimes also
to include any elements-such as the use of communicative symbols-relating to speech's
"communicative impact." See Kitrosser, From Marshall McLuhan to Anthropomorphic Cows,
supra note 1, at 1340.
11. R.A. V.,505 U.S. at 387-89, 395-96 (explaining standards applicable to content-based
regulations of unprotected speech).
12. Id.at 384-90.
13. Id. at 387 (referring to a major rationale for the general content-distinction rule); see also
Alan E. Brownstein, Rules of Engagementfor Cultural Wars: Regulating Conduct, Unprotected
Speech, andProtectedExpression in Anti-Abortion Protests,29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 553,589-611
(1996) (offering justifications for the general content-distinction rule); Kitrosser, From Marshall
McLuhan to Anthropomorphic Cows, supranote 1,at 1392-96 (same); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content
Regulation and the FirstAmendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189,200-33 (1983) (same).
14. In other words, because protected speech has intrinsic value, there is something
intrinsically troubling about singling it out for regulation based on its content. And because
protected speech is instrumentally beneficial to the marketplace of ideas, it makes sense to worry
that content-based regulations will skew debate in the marketplace. See, e.g., Brownstein, supra
note 13, at 589-624.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss4/2
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speech categories are so intrinsically valueless and so instrumentally
harmful that their abolition is consistent with, possibly even dictated by,
free speech values. From this premise, it simply does not follow that the
uneven regulation of unprotected speech is intrinsically or instrumentally
troubling. 5
The doctrinal standards that the Court applies to content-based
regulations of unprotected speech suffer badly for their lack of a coherent
rationale. The Court has crafted a grab bag of standards that range from the
superfluous to the affirmatively damaging. For example, the Court
purports to apply strict scrutiny to content-based regulations of
unprotected speech when in fact it applies a heightened, virtually
insurmountable level of scrutiny.'6 The Court also crafts exceptions to its
presumption against such regulations, but its most promising exception
morphs in character from case to case, making it subject to manipulation
depending on the Court's gut feeling about a given regulation. 7 Finally,
the Court hints that it holds viewpoint-based regulations in particular
disdain and that it is less concerned about regulations based on the use of
particular symbols or expressive modes. 8 The doctrinal implications of
this hint are not entirely clear, which creates another avenue for ad hocery
based on the Court's hunches about particular regulations. To the extent
that this hint does manifest itself in doctrine, this is bad news for free
speech, as it enables content-based regulations to pass muster so long as
they can be described, however questionably, as based on communicative
impact rather than viewpoint or subject matter."
This Article seeks to fill the gap left by existing doctrine and
scholarship by establishing a sound theoretical footing for the position that
content-based regulations of unprotected speech raise important First
Amendment concerns. Once such footing is established, coherent doctrinal
standards can be created. This Article thus establishes a solid theoretical
basis for the position that content-based regulations of unprotected speech
raise First Amendment concerns. The Article then crafts new doctrinal
standards for such regulations and explains the practical implications of
these standards for legislation.
As a matter of theoretical grounding, this Article argues that the
missing analytical link in doctrine and scholarship can be found in the
close relationship between protected speech and unprotected speech. From
this close relationship stems a phenomenon that this Article calls the

15. Seeid. at 611-24.
16. See infra Part V.B.1.
17. See infra Part V.B.1-2.
18. See infra Part V.B.1-2.
19. See infra notes 283-85 and accompanying text (describing how this risk came partly to
Court's reasoning
and the
argument of the state in Virginia v. Black).
fruition in
Published
bythe
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categorization paradox: the notion that categorization is both necessary to
free speech doctrine and necessarily problematic. Categorization is
necessary because it is a relatively speech-protective means of accounting,
doctrinally, for the fact that speech sometimes must be regulated for its
content. At the same time, categorization is necessarily problematic
because the same qualities that might make speech unprotected can bring
the same speech very close on the doctrinal spectrum to protected, even
deeply valued, speech. Given this inescapably close relationship between
protected and unprotected speech, the reach and use of unprotected speech
categories must be carefully contained. The categorization paradox gives
rise, in short, to what this Article calls the containment principle.
The containment principle embodies the notion that content-based
regulations of unprotected speech must be contained to defend against two
risks. First, such regulations operate within a realm of at least some free
speech value and thus raise free speech value-based concerns similar to
those that underscore the content-distinction rule. In particular, such
regulations make it easier for legislatures to regulate speech, enabling
them to hone in solely on the most unpopular forms ofunprotected speech.
By so acting, legislatures may skew public discourse, cause intrinsic harms
to speakers, and cause intrinsic social harms borne of legislative bad faith.
Second, such regulations threaten to serve as vehicles to infringe upon
unprotected speech's close cousin: protected speech.
Identification of the second risk-that content-based regulations of
unprotected speech will infringe on protected speech-is of particular
importance, both because of its novelty and because of the strong light it
sheds on the close relationship between protected speech and unprotected
speech. The risk20takes three forms. First, such regulations can cause any
"chilling effect" on protected speech to be distributed in an uneven,
content-based manner. Second, such regulations threaten to punish persons
partly for using protected speech and partly for using unprotected speech.
For example, a regulation punishing race-based threats may be drawn or
applied in such a way as to punish protected, racist thoughts or speech that
accompany, but that do not form part of, the relevant threats.2 Third, such
regulations threaten to steer speakers and factfinders toward the conclusion
that speech that might otherwise be deemed merely close to the
"unprotected line" in fact crosses the line where a targeted content element

20. "Chilling effect," a term frequently invoked in free speech doctrine and scholarship,
refers to the risk that speech restrictions will inhibit more speech than they technically prohibit
because speakers fearful of punishment will err on the side of caution. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 1, § 11.3.5.2 ("[E]xpression ...can be chilled and limited by tort liability.").
21. The risk exists, in short, when a regulation insufficiently connects the targeted content
element to the unprotected speech category, thus defining punishable expression partly by an
unprotected element and partly by a separate, protected speech element.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss4/2
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is present. 22 For example, a regulation on threats conveyed through crossburning may serve as a cue to factfinders that a cross-burning is inherently
likely to constitute a threat, given the relative salience of the cross-burning
the relative ambiguity as to what constitutes a punishable
factor 2and
3
threat.
After establishing these theoretical foundations, this Article explains
that the grab bag of doctrinal standards crafted by the Court does not mesh
well with these foundations. This Article crafts new doctrinal standards
responsive to this Article's theoretical foundations and explains that these
standards offer more satisfying and more predictable approaches to
statutes such as those cited above.24 Specifically, this Article explains that
only two doctrinal standards are called for in assessing content-based
regulations of unprotected speech. First, courts should ask whether a
content-based regulation of unprotected speech relates substantially to a
harm of the same nature, but more compelling, than that against which the
larger unprotected speech category is directed. This question-which
resembles, but is less malleable than, one of the exceptions crafted by the
Supreme Court2-is designed to ensure that a regulation is important
enough to outweigh any containment-based risks, and that the regulation
is sufficiently related to the larger unprotected speech category to affect
only unprotected speech. Second, courts also should ask if a regulation
threatens protected speech in a manner not likely to be identified through
a general standard.2 6 Finally, this Article makes clear that a hierarchy of
"better" and "worse" content-based regulations-specifically, a hierarchy
of viewpoint-based, subject-matter-based, and communicative impactbased regulations-is not appropriate. While the hierarchy has intuitive

22. In other words, a targeted content element may serve as a heuristic device, suggesting to
speakers and factfinders that the thin line between protected speech and unprotected speech is
bridged where the targeted content element is present.
23. Similarly, a regulation on threats conveyed through cross-burning may create a public
perception that cross-burning is prohibited per se. See infra notes 155-60 and accompanying text
(explaining that this risk manifests itself in the facts underlying Black and that Justice Souter's
concurrence makes reference to this risk).
24. See supra notes 21, 23 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 219-27 and accompanying text.
26. The need for this standard is exemplified by the facts of Virginia v. Black, in which a
statutory provision making cross-burning prima facie evidence that a threat had been made
suggested a legislative desire to skew factfinder decisions toward the punishment of even
nonthreatening cross-burnings. See infra note 286 and accompanying text. Additionally, while this
standard necessarily suffers from some malleability, it is preferable to err on the side of speechprotective malleability than to err on the side of speech-restrictive malleability in using a catch-all
test. The Supreme Court does the latter in asking, as one of its grab bag of standards, whether
something about a regulation under review suggests that the regulation poses no threat that the
"official suppression of ideas" is afoot. See infra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
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appeal, it is not responsive to the concerns posed by content-based
regulations of unprotected speech.
The present time is a uniquely fitting one in which to reconsider this
longstanding conundrum of free speech law. First, neither the Court nor
commentators have considered the implications of the protected
speech/unprotected speech relationship for content-based regulations of
unprotected speech. In particular, neither the Court nor commentators have
considered the threat that content-based regulations of unprotected speech
pose to protected speech. Second, a revisiting of the Court's doctrine is
particularly appropriate now. While the Court first formulated its doctrine
in the 1992 case of R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul,27 the Court recently revisited
the doctrine in the 2003 case of Virginiav. Black.28 While the Black Court
purported to embrace the doctrine and theoretical underpinnings ofR.A. V,
it applied R.A.V. 's doctrinal standards in a way that some deem a sharp
break from R.A. V.29 Black thus sheds important new light on the doctrinal
standards crafted in R.A. V Among other things, it suggests that the
standards are troublingly malleable.30 It also bolsters the view that the
Court places substantial weight on its characterization of a regulation as
viewpoint-based or communicative impact-based. 3 These points cast light,
in turn, on the poverty of R.A. V's theoretical underpinnings and their
consequent inability to generate useful doctrinal standards.
In short, the time is ripe to revisit the doctrine and theory of R.A. V. and
its progeny. This Article begins this task in Parts II and I1by describing
and critiquing existing case law and scholarship. Part II describes and
critiques the theoretical foundations ofR.A. V and Black. Part EIl evaluates
and critiques existing scholarship on the topic, most of which was written
in the wake of R.A. V. Part Ell explains that existing scholarship neither
reassesses the role and scope of categorization doctrine nor looks beyond
the assumption that the regulations at issue impact only unprotected
speech.
Parts IV and V develop this Article's alternative theoretical and
doctrinal approaches. Part IV develops the former, explaining the
categorization paradox and the containment principle as new means to
explain why content-based regulations of unprotected speech raise
constitutional concerns. Part V develops the latter, explaining the doctrinal

27. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
28. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
29. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, ColoredSpeech: CrossBurnings,Epistemics,andthe Triumph
ofthe Crits?,93 GEO. L.J. 575,575-78,603-07 (2005); Frederick Schauer, Intentions,Conventions,
and the First Amendment: The Case of Cross-Burning,2003 SUP. CT. REV. 197, 204-09.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 258-59.
31. See infra note 246 and text accompanying notes 260-61.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss4/2
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standards that should apply to content-based regulations of unprotected
speech in light of the concerns that those regulations raise.
Finally, Part VI applies this Article's approach to the regulations at
issue in R.A. V. and Black and to two hypothetical statutes. The
hypothetical statutes include a statute punishing race-based threats and a
statute punishing fighting words that involve profane language. As Part VI
demonstrates, judicial review of these hypothetical statutes would likely
lead to different outcomes depending on whether or not this Article's
approach were followed. Furthermore, even where practical outcomes
would not differ, judicial reasoning would differ substantially with
significant import for future cases and for free speech doctrine generally.
II. CATEGORIZATION AND THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF R.A.

V

Subpart A describes existing categorization doctrine. Subpart B
critiques the theoretical foundations of the doctrine crafted by the R.A. V.
Court. Subpart B explains that the R.A. V. Court missed an important
opportunity to recharacterize the nature and scope of categorization
doctrine in a meaningful way. Because the Court missed this important
analytical step, its doctrine ultimately rests on an illogical foundation.
A. DescriptiveAnalysis of CategorizationDoctrine
Categorization doctrine encompasses more than categories of "fully
protected" and "fully unprotected" speech. Categories of speech deemed
fully unprotected include speech that intentionally incites imminent illegal
action, fighting words, threats, obscenity, and child pornography.3 2 While
the basic meaning, if not the precise definition, of most of these categories
is likely intuitively clear, the basic meaning of "fighting words" might be
less obvious. It thus bears brief mention that the constitutional definition
of fighting words, while increasingly controversial, refers at the very least
to those words "reasonably considered direct personal insults likely to
invite physical confrontation."33 In addition to these fully unprotected
speech categories, categorization doctrine also affords certain speech
categories a lesser degree of protection than fully protected speech. For

32. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text. Defamation, too, generally is deemed
unprotected. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 132-53 (1999).
Defamation doctrine is relatively complicated, however, as it encompasses varying, context-specific
tests designed to be particularly speech-protective in certain situations, for example, where speech
concerning public figures is at issue. See, e.g., id. Defamation doctrine is discussed infra at notes
173-78 and accompanying text.
33. Kitrosser, From MarshallMcLuhan to Anthropomorphic Cows, supra note 1, at 1347
n.36; see also Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 531, 534
(1980).
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example, commercial speech long has been deemed protected but to a
somewhat lesser degree than other forms of speech.34 And the Supreme
Court often refers to speech that is indecent, but not obscene, as falling
outside of the First Amendment's "core," although the doctrinal
implications of this observation are far from clear.3 5 For purposes of this
Article, the only element of categorization doctrine considered, either in
its own right or in terms of its interaction with content-distinction
principles, is the doctrine's identification of certain speech categories as
fully unprotected. The propriety of "less protected" speech categories and
the intersection of such categories with content-distinction principles raise
distinct issues that extend beyond this Article's scope.
A review of the Supreme Court's major unprotected speech cases
suggests that the Court's justifications for the existence of unprotected
speech can be grouped into two major rationales.36 First, in at least one
case (that of obscenity), the Court places very little emphasis on the
purported harms of the speech, focusing instead on the purported
valuelessness of the speech and vaguely alluding to expressive harms such
as "patent[] offensive[ness]." 37 Second, and more typically, the Court
focuses primarily on harm, concluding that a speech category's harms far
outweigh any expressive value that might exist.38 To varying degrees, this
justification factors into the Court's analysis regarding all unprotected
speech categories aside from obscenity. The Court's justifications for child
pornography, for example, provide an interesting contrast to its
justifications for obscenity. Whereas in the latter category the Court says

34. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,561-63
(1980).
35. See, e.g., Kitrosser, From MarshallMcLuhan to Anthropomorphic Cows, supra note 1,
at 1346 & nn.26-27 (noting that the Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny to restrictions upon
both "core" political speech and speech which "'lie[s] at the periphery of First Amendment
concern"') (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 (1978)).
36. The justification for the existence of unprotected speech categories frequently is linked
to dicta from the seminal fighting words case of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942). Specifically, Chaplinsky often is cited for the proposition that
[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem.... It has been well observed that such utterances are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality.
Id.at 571-72; see also Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (quoting Chaplinsky dicta);
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992) (same).
37. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-30 (1973).
38. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1982).
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very little about harm but deems obscenity lacking in "serious literary,
' in the former category the Court
artistic, political, or scientific value,"39
acknowledges that child pornography may on rare occasions have value,
but it concludes that the harms to its juvenile subjects far outweigh any
value.4" An emphasis on overwhelming harms also is evinced in the
Court's opinions regarding speech likely to incite imminent illegal
activity, fighting words, and threats. In these cases, the Court indicates that
speech that imminently threatens to spark a fight, that otherwise threatens
to incite violence, or that achieves its effect by creating fear of physical
violence bears harms sufficient to justify its suppression.41
The bulk of categorization cases thus suggest that unprotected speech
regulation simply "raise[s no] Constitutional problem" because any speech
value is de minimis and is outweighed by overwhelming harms.42
Categorization cases also suggest that harms caused by unprotected speech
not only outweigh any de minimis value but also operate in a manner
antithetical to free speech value. Modern incitement doctrine, for example,
seems grounded not only in the notion that speech inciting imminent
lawless action causes grave harms, but also in the notion that such speech
circumvents the conditions assumed in classical instrumental theories of
free speech value by achieving its effect before other speech can compete
against it in the marketplace of ideas.43 And the recent, controversial split
by an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit over the constitutional definition
of "true threats" was motivated partly by competing conclusions as to

39. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
40. See Ferber,458 U.S. at 761-65; see also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108 (1990)
(distinguishing a statute prohibiting the private possession of child pornography from a statute
prohibiting the private possession of obscenity on the basis that the state interests underlying the
former "far exceed" those underlying the latter).
41. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); Watts v. United States, 394
U.S. 705, 707 (1969); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-73; cf Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
dissenting) (stating that suppression on the basis that speech poses a clear
630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
and present danger is justified only when speech "so imminently threaten[s] immediate interference
with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the
country").
42. See infra note 36 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72).
43. Indeed, the relatively rigid and speech-protective requirements announced in
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. at 447, particularly the imminence requirement, id., seem
responsive to earlier dissents by Justice Holmes to the effect that speech should be left to compete
in the marketplace of ideas unless speech "so imminently threaten[s] immediate interference with
the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the
country." Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630; see also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) ("If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are
destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech
is that they should be given their chance and have their way."); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE
SPEECH: A PHLOsoPHIcAL ENQUIRY 30 (1982).
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when threats circumvent the preconditions of intrinsic and instrumental
free speech theories by undermining threat recipients' autonomy and
ability to respond to the threats." Finally, as will be discussed in Part 7V,
it bears noting that there is some recognition in categorization case
law-particularly in the area of defamation-of the fine line separating
protected and unprotected speech.45 With a notable exception,46 however,
this recognition manifests itself only in the view that unprotected speech
categories must be carefully defined. Any cautionary notes in the case law
thus are reconciled with the absolutist language of most categorization
cases through the implicit assumption that unprotected speech categories,
once defined, are safe regulatory tools. It thus is assumed implicitly that
unprotected speech categories, once selected and defined, can be regulated
without risk to free speech value in general or to protected speech in
particular.
B. R.A.V. and CategorizationDoctrine
Section 1 begins with a brief description of R.A. V's facts and the
theoretical foundations outlined in R.A. V for the proposition that contentbased regulations of unprotected speech are constitutionally problematic.
Section 2 critiques R.A. V 's theoretical foundations, emphasizing their
inconsistency with categorization doctrine and the Court's failure to
meaningfully reassess categorization doctrine to explain its departure from
the same.
1. Descriptive Analysis of R.A. V's Background and Theoretical
Foundations
The events giving rise to R.A. V. v. City of St. Paulbegan when several
teenagers, including R.A.V.,4 7 burned a cross inside of the fenced yard of
an African-American family during predawn hours.4" The cross-burning
could have been prosecuted under a number of state statutes, including
statutes punishing terroristic threats and statutes punishing property

44. Planmed Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1085-86 (9th Cir.
2002); id. at 1088-89 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting); id. at 1098-1100 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); id.
1101-07 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
45. See infra Part IV.D.
46. For discussion ofthe "notable exception," see infranotes 179-86 and accompanying text
(citing Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963)).
47. R.A.V. was a juvenile at the time that he was charged with the crime. R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992).
48. Id. at 379. These facts are recounted in greater detail elsewhere. See, e.g., Charles R.
Lawrence, III, Crossburningand the Sound of Silence: Antisubordination Theory and the First
Amendment, 37 ViL. L. REV. 787, 787-88 (1992).
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damage.49 Instead, R.A.V. was prosecuted under a state statute prohibiting
racially-motivated assaults and a local ordinance." Although R.A.V. did
not challenge the state assault statute under which he was prosecuted," he
did challenge the constitutionality of the local ordinance.52
The local ordinance under which R.A.V. was prosecuted provided as
follows:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol,
object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but
not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one
knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger,
alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color,
creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.5 3
R.A.V. challenged the ordinance as overbroad, arguing that it reached well
beyond the realm of unprotected speech categories-particularly fighting
words-to punish protected speech.54 The Minnesota Supreme Court
disagreed, construing the ordinance to reach only fighting words55 and
deemed the ordinance constitutional.56 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari.57
While all nine members of the Supreme Court agreed that the local
ordinance was unconstitutional, the Court divided sharply over the basis
for this conclusion. Justices White, Blackmun, O'Connor, and Stevens
would have voided the ordinance "by holding ...that [it] is fatally
overbroad because it criminalizes not only unprotected expression, but also
expression protected by the First Amendment."58 A majority of the Court,
comprised of Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas
("the R.A. V. Court"), accepted the Minnesota Supreme Court's
construction of the ordinance as reaching only unprotected fighting
words,59 but it deemed the ordinance impermissibly content-based because

49. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 380 n.1.
50. Id. at 379-80, 380 & n.2.
51. Id. at380n.2.
52. Id. at 380.
53. Id.at 380 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
54. Id.at 380; see also In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 508-09 (Minn. 1991).
55. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 380-81; Welfare ofR.A. V.,
464 N.W.2d at 510.
56. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 380-81; Welfare ofR.A. V.,
464 N.W.2d at 510-11.
57. 501 U.S. 1204 (1991).
58. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 397 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
59. R.A. V.,
505 U.S. at 381,391. It is somewhat unclear whether the Court actually accepted
the Minnesota Supreme Court's construction of the statute or whether the Court made this
assumption arguendo. See id.
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it reached 60only those fighting words used to "express views on disfavored
subjects.5
The R.A. V Court explained that the Court's many references over the
years to unprotected speech categories falling entirely outside of "'the area
of constitutionally protected speech"' are not literally true, and that
content-distinction principles are applicable even to unprotected speech.6 '
The R.A. V Court further explained that while unprotected speech
categories always can be regulated in their entirety, subcategories of such
categories generally may not be singled out and regulated on contentspecific bases. 62 Thus, while states and localities may regulate all fighting
words without constitutional difficulty, states and localities generally may
not regulate only63 those fighting words based on race, gender, or other
specified topics.

It was incumbent upon the R.A. V Court to explain why contentdistinction principles are relevant to unprotected speech. The Court's
analysis is far from clear on this point, but it suggests two major bases for
the Court's invoking content-distinction principles: instrumental concerns
and intrinsic concerns. As for the former, the Court states that while
unprotected speech categories such as fighting words constitute "'no
essentialpart of any exposition of ideas,' 64 the categories can be "quite
expressive indeed." 5 The Court also states that a state or locality may not
"license one side of a debate to fight freestyle [by allowing them to use
fighting words or other unprotected speech forms], while requiring the
other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules [by prohibiting them from
using fighting words or other unprotected speech forms]. 66 Taken
together, these points suggest a concern by the R.A. V Court that contentbased regulations of unprotected speech will skew debate in the
marketplace of ideas by permitting only some speakers to use unprotected
speech forms. As for intrinsic concerns, the Court refers repeatedly to the
general risks of content-based decisionmaking, such as the risk that the
"official suppression of ideas is afoot,"' 7 or the risk that regulation is based
on "hostility-or favoritism-towards the underlying message
expressed., 68 Such statements suggest a belief that government regulation

60. Id. at 391.
61. Id. at 383-84 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957)).
62. Id. at 383-84.
63. Id. at 386.
64. Id. at 385 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,572 (1942) (emphasis
added by R.A. V Court)).
65. Id.
66. Id.at 392.
67. Id. at 390.
68. Id.at 386; see also id.at 388 (referring to the "danger of idea or viewpoint
discrimination").
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based on favoritism toward the ideas expressed by regulated behavior is
intrinsically problematic.
Part V of this Article describes and critiques the doctrinal standards
drawn by the R.A. V.Court. It suffices for now to note that the Court drew
relatively challenging standards in response to the intrinsic and
instrumental concerns that it outlined.69 While the standards are not
irretrievably far from the mark when viewed from a containment-based
approach, they are confusing and imprecise as means of responding to the
close relationship between protected and unprotected speech and the risk
that the regulations at issue will infringe on protected speech. Such
incoherence and imprecision are not surprising because the R.A. V.Court's
cited concerns, which constitute its theoretical foundations, do not
meaningfully address the categorization paradox and consequent
containment principles. The next Section critiques R.A. V's theoretical
foundations.
2. Critique of R.A. V's Theoretical Foundations
The R.A. V Court's invocation of intrinsic and instrumental concerns
makes sense only if one understands that free speech value is not absent
from the realm of unprotected speech and that unprotected speech
categories threaten protected speech. This Section explains that while the
R.A. V Court's analysis approaches the first observation, the analysis
ultimately falters in its approach and barely addresses the second
observation. As a result, the Court fails to resolve a basic inconsistency
with categorization doctrine.
The R.A. V Court approaches the insight of the categorization paradox
in its observation that unprotected speech categories can be "quite
expressive indeed"7 and that their regulation thus might skew the
marketplace of ideas. The problem with this explanation, however, is that
it does not go nearly far enough. It long has been clear that unprotected
speech can be regulated precisely because of its expressive content.7 '
Indeed, the concept of unprotected speech raises so many difficulties
precisely because the status of most unprotected speech categories stems
from harms linked to expression. Incitement doctrine, for example, took
decades to develop and remains controversial precisely because speech
that intentionally incites imminent illegal activity may involve
impassioned calls to action grounded in social or political views. 72 Where

69. See infra Part V.B. 1.
70. R.A. V.,505 U.S. at 384-85 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942)).
71. See infra Part II.A.
doctrine's
of incitement
72. by
ForUF
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such expression is so closely "brigaded with action"73 that it intentionally
and imminently incites illegal activity, it is said to cross a fine line
separating punishable triggers to action from protected expression that
advocates illegal activity more abstractly.74 While speech on the former
side of the line may well generate harms so overwhelming and
unstoppable as to justify punishment, it would be folly to pretend that such
speech does not create its harms through expressive effect, just as speech
on the latter side of the line is valued for its strong expressive effect. 75 The
same may be said of threats and fighting words, both of which mark a thin
line separating vituperative speech from speech that intentionally alarms
or angers to such a degree as to cause paralyzing fear or immediate
violence.76 Because these unprotected speech categories represent a
judgment that speech is punishable precisely because its expressive effects
cross a line into the realm of the intolerable, it requires more than mere
assertion to explain why these expressive effects also are so valuable as to
cause concern whenever they are experienced unevenly throughout the
speech marketplace.77

HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 119-236 (Jamie

Kalven ed., 1988); Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the FirstAmendment:
In Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1159, 1166-77 (1982) [hereinafter
Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct].
73. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring).
74. See, e.g., KALVEN, supra note 72, at 234-36 (explaining the "Brandenburgline").
75. See id.
76. See, e.g., Gard, supranote 33, at 534,536; Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom ofSpeech and
True Threats, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 283, 285 (2001).
77. Nor does the Court's instrumental or skewing-effect rationale square with the Court's
judgments that some speech categories have so little expressive value that they are unworthy of
protection and that the production of some speech is so harmful as to outweigh any expressive value
that might inhere in the speech category. The former judgment manifests itself in obscenity
doctrine. See supranotes 37-39 and accompanying text. Ifthe notion that speech can be labeled so
valueless as to be unworthy of protection is taken seriously, it logically follows that any harm
caused by the uneven distribution of this speech is negligible at best. The latter judgment manifests
itself in child pornography doctrine, which is grounded mainly in the notion that the overwhelming
harms of production and distribution outweigh any speech value that might exist. See supra note
40 and accompanying text. It follows from this notion that any speech-related harms stemming
from the uneven, content-based distribution of child pornography also are outweighed by
overwhelming harms. As for the latter observation about child pornography, it bears noting that
while child pornography doctrine is grounded partly in the assumption that such speech is unlikely
to have much value and that any minimal value likely can be retained through simulation (such as
by having adults play the roles ofjuveniles), see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762-63 (1982),
the doctrine is grounded primarily in a harm-based analysis. First, the Court has concluded that
child pornography's production is overwhelmingly harmful to its juvenile participants and that such
production cannot effectively be stopped unless the end product can be banned. Id. at 756-62.
Second, the Court has concluded that the emotional damage of production is exacerbated by the
juvenile participants' knowledge that the end product can be sold and consumed. Id.at 759.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss4/2
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Furthermore, while the R.A. V Court's intrinsic harms rationale could
be deemed to relate remotely to protected speech infringement, the Court's
discussion ultimately steers clear of this rationale and thus remains
inconsistent with categorization doctrine. The Court explains that "the
power to proscribe [unprotected speech] on the basis of one content
element (e.g., obscenity) does not entail the power to proscribe it on the
basis of other content elements,"7 apparently deeming the latter
intrinsically problematic. Interpreted generously, one might view this
statement as evincing a subtextual concern that legislatures can harness
protected content elements to unprotected speech categories and thus can
treat the latter as regulatory vehicles through which to punish the former.
The problem with this interpretation is that the R.A. V Court clearly
assumes that any speech punished through an unprotected speech
regulation indeed is unprotected speech.79 The Court thus relies on the
notion that there simply is something intrinsically wrong with punishing
unprotected speech on the basis of its content. This returns us to a
fundamental dilemma: the apparent incompatibility of this notion with
categorization doctrine.
Such incompatibility might best be explained through an example of
the type of government activity about which the Court seems concerned:
a legislature wishes to prohibit all racist speech because it detests racist
ideas and wishes to convey its hostility toward racism. The legislature
cannot, however, prohibit all racist speech because much racist speech is
constitutionally protected. Therefore, the legislature uses an unprotected
speech category as a vehicle through which it can partly satisfy its desire
to squelch racist expression and demonstrate its hostility toward racist
ideas.
While the R.A. V Court's concern over such activity has some intuitive
appeal, it crumbles rather quickly upon analysis. Government motivation
to suppress particular ideas is deeply problematic in the context of
protected expression precisely because such motivation manifests itself in
the suppression of expression deemed valuable from any number of
perspectives, including those focused on speaker or audience autonomy
and those focused on the social value of speech. 0 But it is not immediately
clear that these concerns are present where government partiality manifests
itself in the regulation of activity deemed so worthless or so harmful as to
fall outside of the First Amendment's protective zone. Indeed, the R.A. V

78. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992).
79. See, e.g., id. at 383-90 (describing justifications for limiting the regulation of
"proscribable speech").
80. See supra notes 1, 14 and accompanying text (referring to intrinsic and instrumental
theories of free speech value and to the reliance of the general content-distinction rule on these
theories).by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
Published
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Court's concern with government motivation devolves, upon
consideration, into a generalized concern with government partiality. Such
concern sweeps so broadly as to implicate almost all areas of government
regulation, as most government regulations can be characterized as
intentionally disadvantaging particular ideas as they manifest themselves
in regulated behaviors."1
One might defend the R.A. V Court's intrinsic distaste for government
favoritism by arguing that such favoritism infringes on free thought even
if it does not infringe on free speech, because such favoritism embodies a
desire to punish particular thoughts that manifest themselves in
unprotected speech. 2 To the extent that the argument suggests that thought
elements can never form part of a criminal or civil wrong, it runs counter
to a long and generally justified practice of deeming thought elements,
such as intent, part of criminal and civil wrongs.8 3 The argument thus must
devolve to the point that thought elements, such as viewpoints and subject
matter, are not appropriate bases for defining or enhancing punishment. At
this point, however, the argument intersects with an important question
raised by this Article: when does a thought or speech element form part of
unprotected speech, and when does it merely accompany unprotected
speech and thus remain protected? To the extent that particular thought
elements remain unexpressed by a speaker or otherwise do not form part
of the speaker's unprotected speech, they are clearly protected. To the
extent that particular thought elements do manifest themselves in
unprotected speech, even contributing to the character that makes the
speech unprotected (expressed racism might, for example, enhance the
frightening nature of a threat)," they form part of the unprotected speech
and would seem, by the logic of categorization doctrine, to be
constitutionally punishable.

81. Of course, any government distinction, even within categories ofunprotected speech, may
be subject to an equal protection challenge under rational basis review. See CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 1, § 9.2. 1. But a free speech value-based explanation must be supplied if the distinction is said
to raise First Amendment concerns and thus to justify a higher level of scrutiny. Id. § 10.1.1
(discrimination with respect to fundamental rights receives strict scrutiny).

82. Martin Redish makes a similar point with respect to motive-based regulations of
prohibited conduct, such as hate crimes legislation. Martin H. Redish, Freedom of Thought as
Freedom of Expression: Hate Crime Sentencing Enhancement and FirstAmendment Theory, I1
CRIM. JUST. ETmIcs 29,37-39 (1992).
83. See, e.g., Frederick M. Lawrence, Resolving the Hate Crimes/Hate Speech Paradox:
PunishingBias Crimes andProtectingRacist Speech, 68 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 673,717-18 (1993);
Note, Hate is Not Speech: A ConstitutionalDefense of PenaltyEnhancementforHate Crimes, 106
HARv. L. REV. 1314, 1323-25 (1993).
84. See infra Part VI.C (invoking the hypothetical example of a regulation targeting race-

based threats).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss4/2
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Finally, the weak and make-shift nature of the Court's intrinsic and
instrumental rationales is further evidenced by the sharp inconsistency
between such rationales and the Court's opinion in Wisconsin v. Mitchell,85
decided in the years between R.A. V and Black. In Mitchell, the Court
upheld a statutory sentencing enhancement for an aggravated battery
conviction based on the fact that the defendant selected his victim because
of the victim's race.86 The Mitchell Court relied partly on the notion that
content-based regulations raise little or no constitutional problem where
the regulations target "conduct unprotected by the First Amendment."87 If
neither the impact of content-based regulations nor their underlying
purpose are of constitutional concern where the content element (in this
case, race-based motivation) manifests itself in conduct unprotected by the
First Amendment, it is difficult to see why such impact or purpose is of
constitutional concern where a regulated content element manifests itself
in expression deemed beyond the First Amendment's reach.
In failing to bridge the gap between its conclusions and the premises
of categorization doctrine, the R.A. V.Court not only leaves a riddle
unsolved, but also misses an important opportunity to reassess the nature
and role of categorization doctrine. The Court could have explained that
categorization doctrine, while necessary, is inherently risky because of the
fine line separating unprotected speech content from protected, even
highly valued speech content. Given this fine line, neither free speech
value nor the instrumental and intrinsic concerns on which the contentdistinction rests can be deemed completely absent from the realm of
unprotected speech. Consideration of the relationship between protected
speech and unprotected speech could also have shed light on the risk that
unprotected speech categories will infringe on protected speech, whether
through the chilling effect, by the harnessing of protected speech elements
to unprotected speech legislation, or through the heuristic impact of
linking content elements to unprotected speech categories.88 Such analysis,
too, could have provided an important link between categorization doctrine
and content-distinction principles, a link missing from the Supreme
Court's analysis of the issue.
Il. CRITIQUE OF EXISTING SCHOLARSHIP

While some important scholarly debate has occurred in the years since
R.A. V, notably absent from this debate is consideration of the fine line
between protected speech and unprotected speech, the impact that

85. 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
86. Id.at 479.
87. Id.at 487.
88. by
SeeUFsupra
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unprotected speech regulations might therefore have on free speech value,
and the risk that unprotected speech regulations pose to protected speech.
This Part summarizes and critiques the major scholarly arguments,
discussing much of what is valuable in this scholarship while also
discussing important problems and gaps in the scholarship.
The major scholarly arguments can be grouped into two core
categories. The first category consists of those arguments that reason
predominantly from existing doctrine, embracing content-distinction
and/or categorization principles and considering how well R.A. V fits
within these principles. The second category consists of those arguments
that critique R.A. V. for presuming the centrality of content-distinction
principles in free speech doctrine in the first place, and/or that critique
R.A. V. for overlooking the important role that equality principles should
play in free speech doctrine.
A. Arguments that Criticize or Embrace R.A.V. From the Perspective
of Existing Content-Distinctionand/or CategorizationPrinciples
Of those scholars who criticize R.A. V. from the perspective of existing
content-distinction or categorization principles, a few focus largely on the
point that it is illogical to apply content-distinction principles, or any level
of heightened scrutiny, to speech deemed outside of the First
Amendment.89 This point, while significant, tends nonetheless to be
unaccompanied by sustained analysis regarding the possible grounds on
which such application could be justified.9" Without serious confrontation
of the intrinsic and instrumental rationales suggested by the R.A. V. Court
or of other possible rationales, it is difficult to reject the argument that
content-distinction principles have a role to play in the assessment of
unprotected speech categories.
Another subset of scholars embraces all or part ofR.A. V.'s doctrine and
rationale from the perspective of existing content-distinction or
categorization principles. Of these scholars, most fail to grapple seriously
with the tensions posed between content-distinction and categorization
principles, leading to an overly easy acceptance of all or part of the R.A. V.
Court's approach. For example, Ronald Rotunda celebrates R.A. V. for its
stance against the state's "officially suppress[ing] ideas" "[e]ven when
prohibiting fighting words"'" and for its rejection of "political correctness
89. See, e.g., G. Sidney Buchanan, The Hate Speech Case: A Pyrrhic Victory for Freedom
of Speech?, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 285, 296-98 (1992); David Goldberger, Hate Crime Laws and
Their Impact on the FirstAmendment, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 569,573-75,578-79 (1993);
Philip Weinberg, R.A.V. and Mitchell: Making Hate Crimea Trivial Pursuit,25 CONN. L. REV.
299, 300-09 (1993).
90. See supra note 89.
91. Ronald D. Rotunda, A Brief Comment on Politically Incorrect Speech in the Wake of20
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss4/2
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' Rotunda's arguments largely
as a gloss limiting the First Amendment."92
93
track the R.A. V.Court's logic without adequately explaining why the
interests that underscore content-based or even viewpoint-based
regulations are present when the speech suppressed is deemed so harmful
or so valueless as to fall outside of the Constitution's protections.
Similarly, Murray Dry embraces the R.A. V Court's opinion largely by
tracking the Court's emphasis on the special evils of viewpoint
discrimination and by citing the dangers of "political correctness." 94 Dry's
argument, too, fails seriously to confront arguments based on
categorization principles. Laurence Tribe justifies R.A. V's result through
analysis that is more nuanced than that of Rotunda or Dry but that
similarly fails to consider the conflict between R.A. V and categorization
principles.95 Specifically, Tribe explains that it is permissible to condition
punishment on one's motivation to do a particular thing, such as selecting
one's victim based on race, but that it is impermissible to condition
punishment on one's motivation to express a particular message.96 Tribe
concludes that the St. Paul ordinance did the latter and thus that the R.A. V
Court's decision isjustified.97 This point fails to grapple with the argument
that when only unprotected speech is targeted and impacted, any message
punished is a component of speech deemed so harmful or so valueless as

R.A.V., 47 SMUL. REv. 9, 20-21 (1993).
92. Id.at 15.
93. See id. at 16-22. In addition to tracking the R.A. V.Court's logic, Rotunda states in his
conclusion:
If bad motive or the belief in bigotry may be made a crime, then the state can
question defendants and subpoena records as to what newspapers or magazines
they read, what books are in their library, or what they have confided to their
friends. All of this information is relevant because it may show the propensity to
commit the crime of bad motive, the offense of being politically incorrect. In
addition, if the magazine article or book that advocates the politically incorrect
viewpoint is persuasive, then it may be a crime for the author to have written it.
Id.at 21. Rotunda does not explain why laws singling out particular types of speech content
necessarily require probes into other protected speech consumed or engaged in by defendants. In
any event, if a law were to have this effect, its basis for invalidation would be its impact on
protected speech, not constitutional problems inherent in the content-based regulation of
unprotectedspeech. That Rotunda is partly concerned with protected speech infringement also is
reflected in an earlier part of his essay, in which he emphasizes the narrow scope of fighting words
doctrine and the fact that much "hate speech" regulation extends well beyond this scope. Id.at 1215.
94. Murray Dry, Hate Speech andthe Constitution, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 501,506-08,512
(1994-95).
95. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Mystery of Motive, PrivateandPublic: Some Notes Inspired
by the Problems of Hate Crimeand Animal Sacrifice, 1993 SuP. CT.REv. 1, 5, 8-9, 11.
96. Id.
15.
97. by
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to fall outside of the Constitution's protection. From this perspective,
Tribe's argument has weight only if at least one of two conditions applies:
there is a convincing reason not to trust that unprotected speech categories
effectively lack free speech value (or that any such value is clearly
outweighed) or the St. Paul ordinance in some way punishes or threatens
to punish a message encompassed in protected speech or thought.98
Scholarship embracing R.A. V.'s doctrine after acknowledging the
tension between R.A. V and categorization principles also leaves questions
to be answered. An article by Edward J. Eberle recognizes, on the one
hand, that there is a tension between R.A. V. and categorization
principles,99 that this tension threatens to dilute protected speech
protections," ° and that the R.A. V Court is disingenuous in purporting to
apply standard strict scrutiny rather than a significantly heightened form
of strict scrutiny."0 ' On the other hand, Eberle embraces the R.A. V
Court's doctrine on the basis that it is highly speech-protective because
it reflects a strong rejection of viewpoint discrimination"0 2 and because
the doctrine, when viewed in tandem with Mitchell, reflects a strong
commitment to separating speech from conduct and vigorously protecting
the former.0 3 There are two major difficulties with Eberle's argument.
First, while Eberle applauds the R.A. V. Court's use of heightened strict
scrutiny because he deems it a strong defense against viewpoint-based
regulations," °4 Eberle fails to consider seriously why viewpoint
discrimination is problematic if such discrimination targets and affects
only unprotected speech. While Eberle acknowledges the general tension

98. Also worth noting is Akhil Amar's argument, which breaks the R.A. V. opinion into two
major components. One component, which Amar criticizes, is the Court's failure to take into
account the special relevance of race in constitutional law. Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the
MissingAmendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REv. 124, 125-26, 130-31, 151-61
(1992). The second component, which he deems a highly positive development, is the R.A. V.
Court's strong affirmation of certain speech-protective principles including the notions that
symbolic speech is fully protected and that viewpoint discrimination is anathema to the First
Amendment. Id. at 125, 132-46. One may interpret Amar's discussion of R.A. V.'s second
component in one of two ways. Amar may embrace R.A. V.'s speech-protective principles because
oftheir potential application to protected speech, particularly insofar as such principles were called
into question in case law prior to R.A. V. See id. at 124-25. Alternatively, Amar may embrace the
application of these principles to unprotected speech. If the latter is the case then Amar's analysis,
too, fails to address the tension between R.A. V. and categorization principles.
99. Edward J. Eberle, HateSpeech, Offensive Speech, and PublicDiscourse in America, 29
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1135, 1143,1146,1159-70 (1994).
100. Id. at 1146, 1159-70.
101. Id. at 1145, 1162-63, 1170-71; see also infra notes 201-09 and accompanying text
(discussing the R.A. V. Court's disingenuous use of "heightened" strict scrutiny).
102. Eberle, supra note 99, at 1139, 1145, 1170-72, 1176-78.
103. Id. at 1169-70.
104. Id. at 1139, 1145, 1170-72, 1176-78.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss4/2
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posed between R.A. V. and categorization doctrine and cites the standard
arguments that viewpoint discrimination is highly paternalistic and skews
public discourse,' °5 Eberle does not explain why the standard arguments
resonate with respect to speech deemed so harmful or valueless as to be
beyond constitutional protection.0 6 Second, Eberle's emphasis on the
importance of separating speech from conduct and of vigorously
protecting only the former contradicts much of the rest of his analysis. If
protections against viewpoint discrimination are so crucial that they should
be invoked even in the realm of unprotected speech, it is difficult to see
why this principle does not apply in the realm of conduct that expresses or
is motivated by a particular viewpoint.'0 7

105. Id.at 1172.
106. The closest that Eberle comes to rendering such explanation is in his contention that the
R.A. V. Court properly separates "proscribable" speech elements from "protected" speech elements
such as viewpoint or subject matter. Id. at 1152. Eberle suggests that this point is grounded in an
intrinsic view of free speech value, whereby speech is measured by its value to the speaker,
regardless of its positive or negative social impact. Id. at 1147, 1150. The problem with Eberle's
"elements" point is that it fails to acknowledge that where "protected" elements form part of
proscribable speech, such elements form a part of speech deemed so harmful or so valueless as to
raise few intrinsic or instrumental concerns. If elements of proscribable speech themselves are not
devoid of value, it must be because the proscribable speech of which they form a part itself is not
devoid of value or even constitutes protected speech. It is this analytical link that Eberle, like the
R.A. V. Court, does not make. Similarly, Eberle's point about free speech value runs counter to the
assumption, which he does not answer, that deeming speech (or speech "elements") categorically
proscribable involves a calculation that any free speech value either is absent or significantly
outweighed. In any event, Eberle's free speech theory point rests somewhat on a shifting
foundation. Early in his article, Eberle explains that "[t]he majority of the Court in R.A.V. preferred
a nonconsequentialist view, finding that speech is valuable as an end itself, independent of any
consequences that it might produce." Id. at 1147; see also id at 1150. At another point, however,
Eberle writes that
[t]he Court's narrowing of the areas beyond protection of the First
Amendment reflects the high value it places on free speech, both as an end in
itself and as a means to the accomplishment of other important ends. From this
vantage point, all expression is presumptively beyond governmental power. In
service of this ideal, the Court seems committed to opening the channels of
communication widely, allowing the transmission of more ideas and information
so that we may acquire "an ever better understanding of reality" or better achieve
other desirable goals, such as democratic self-government.
Id. at 1155 (quoting Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Expression:An Essay on Theory and Doctrine,
78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1137, 1155 (1983)) (footnote call numbers omitted).
107. Eberle attempts to address such concerns by acknowledging that much nonverbal conduct
is expressive in nature and arguing that such conduct can be regulated for its "conduct" elements
but not for its communicative elements. Id. at 1198-99. However, Eberle also argues that the statute
at issue in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993), which enhanced aggravated battery
convictions where victims were selected on the basis of their race, clearly was constitutional and
distinguishable from the St. Paul ordinance at issue in R.A. V Eberle, supra note 99, at 1197-1204.
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While an article by Alan Brownstein is unusually reflective in
considering whether content-distinction principles have a role to play with
respect to unprotected speech, two facets of Brownstein's argument merit
critique. First, Brownstein details the rationales typically offered for
applying the content-distinction to protected speech, including intrinsic
and instrumental concerns and fears that legislatures more readily will
10 8
suppress speech when they can hone in on unpopular speech content.
Brownstein concludes that these rationales do not apply to speech deemed
so harmful or so valueless as to be unprotected.'0 9 Brownstein's point
usefully highlights the R.A. V.Court's failure to reconcile its approach with
the traditional assumptions of categorization doctrine. Brownstein stops
short, however, of considering whether categorization doctrine's
traditional assumptions should be reassessed and whether such
reassessment is the missing analytical link that eludes the R.A. V.Court.
Brownstein thus fails to consider the possibility that there is reason to not
fully trust unprotected speech categories, either because free speech value
may exist within the categories or because the categories may serve as
vehicles to infringe on protected speech.
Second, Brownstein's alternative rationale for closely scrutinizing
content-based regulations of unprotected speech, while provocative, is
highly strained. After concluding that the arguments typically raised
against viewpoint-based and content-based regulations of protected speech
are inapplicable to unprotected speech," 0 Brownstein explains that
viewpoint-based regulations of unprotected speech should receive strict
scrutiny and other content-based regulations of unprotected speech should
receive intermediate scrutiny."' Brownstein argues that viewpoint-based
regulations of unprotected speech intolerably distort the marketplace of
ideas, not by directly removing valuable speech from the marketplace, but
by "empowering one side of an ideological conflict with dangerous
weapons that are denied to its opponents.""' 2 Brownstein also deems it
constitutionally problematic, though to a lesser degree, to empower only
those discussing selected subject matters or using other forms of selected
content to abuse others through unprotected speech." 3 The core problem

It is difficult to understand why Eberle deems race-based motivation that manifests itself in
noncommunicative content clearly punishable while deeming race-based motivation that manifests
itself in unprotected speech presumptively protected.
108. Brownstein, supranote 13, at 589-611.
109. Id. at 611-24.
110. Id. at 589-624.
111. Id. at 586-87. Brownstein would apply the same logic and doctrinal standards to motivebased regulations of nonspeech conduct, such as hate crime laws. Id.
112. Id. at 628.
113. Id. at 633-34.
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with Brownstein's argument is that its foundations simply are illogical. 1
Brownstein's "abuse" argument assumes that jurisdictions respond to
clearly delineated sides in private debates and that they can, by protecting
or less strictly punishing certain types of abuse, cause or intend to cause
the abuse of persons clearly identified with certain sides or aspects of such
debates. This argument requires major logical leaps regarding the state's
ability to predict that certain content-identified speakers will be abused if
others are "licensed" to use unprotected speech and equating such private
abuse with state discrimination against the relevant speech content. Such
leaps are simply too tenuous to support a free speech claim to the effect
that states seek, through content-based regulations of threats and fighting
words, to commission private actors to abuse those engaged in contentspecific, protected speech or thought. Nor could Brownstein's argument
withstand scrutiny if it were reframed as an argument that "unlicensed" or
more heavily punished speakers are deprived of the ability to match abuse
for abuse because of their expressive content. Such an argument
effectively constitutes a claim of right to engage in unprotected speech-a
claim that, as we have seen, has yet to be justified." 5
Finally, the rendering of the Black decision provides a useful
opportunity to consider a more recent take on R.A. V. Guy Charles offers
a descriptive explanation of the R.A. V Court's logic in an article that seeks
to reconcile the different outcomes in R.A. V and Black by emphasizing the
role of critical race theory in the latter." 6 Charles explains that the R.A. V
Court's concern might have been government motivation, with the Court
deeming it acceptable for the state to regulate unprotected speech for the
very reasons that make it unprotected but unacceptable to regulate it for

114. There also are other important, but less fundamental, problems in Brownstein's
arguments. First, Brownstein's logic extends only to fighting words and threats, as it would be
difficult to characterize other unprotected speech categories as involving "dangerous weapons"
used by one side of a conflict against the other side. See id. at 628. Second, Brownstein's argument
seems to assume jurisdictions in which threats and fighting words generally are not punished and
in which the only restrictions on such speech are content-based. Hence, Brownstein's reference to
the fact that one side of a conflict is allowed, even "empower[ed]" to use "weapons" denied to the
other side. See id. at 591. It seems far more likely that a given jurisdiction will have general threat
provisions and general breach of the peace provisions encompassing fighting words, while also
having more specific, content-based laws or sentence enhancements. Of course, this shortcoming
does not render Brownstein's point irrelevant, as one could argue that jurisdictions with both
general and content-specific provisions improperly single out specified sides of arguments for
heightened punishment. The shortcoming does, however, call into question the force of
Brownstein's point.
115. Frederick Lawrence and Ronald Turner raise points similar to those raised by Brownstein
regarding the arguable unfairness of punishing some groups, but not others, for using unprotected
speech. See Lawrence, supra note 83, at 712-13; Ronald Turner, Hate Speech and the First
Amendment: The Supreme Court's R.A.V. Decision, 61 TENN. L. REv. 197,223-24 (1993).
116. Charles, supra note 29, at 608-32.
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unrelated content or viewpoint-based reasons." 7 Charles's point is
descriptive, not normative. "' If descriptive of the R.A. V Court's rationale,
however, it brings the Court no closer to a satisfying explanation for its
doctrine. Where legislatures are deemed to be discriminating within the
realm of "nonspeech," Mitchell suggests that such discrimination is
subject-at most-to rational basis review. "9 If concerns justifying more
rigorous scrutiny exist within the realm of unprotected speech, they remain
to be explained.
B. Arguments That Criticize R.A.V. for Overemphasizingthe
Centrality of Content-DistinctionPrinciplesand/orfor
UnderemphasizingEquality Principles
Steven Shiffrin criticizes the R.A. V. Court for deeming neutrality, and
hence the content-distinction principle, the core free speech value while
ignoring the proliferation of content-based judgments throughout
categorization doctrine12° and overlooking the fact that equality principles
sometimes outweigh neutrality principles. 2 ' Shiffrin directs the bulk of his
analysis toward the points that neutrality values must be considered in
tandem with the values of dissent and equality in free speech
jurisprudence,' and that such consideration yields the conclusions that
much racist speech is not constitutionally protected but that it should not,
for policy reasons, be fully regulated. 3 While Shiffrin emphasizes his
theory of competing values in free speech jurisprudence, his foundational
point regarding the reflexive nature of R.A. V's doctrine helps to further
illuminate the need for probing analysis as to the propriety of
categorization in free speech doctrine and as to whether, when, and why
content-distinction principles have a role to play with respect to
unprotected speech.
Other scholars, regardless of their views on the relative significance of
neutrality as a constitutional principle, share Shiffrin's view that the R.A. V
117. Id. at 590-95.
118. Similar descriptive points were helpfully suggested to me by Larry Alexander and Nelson
Tebbe. See Schauer, supra note 29, at 207 ("[It is sounder to think... of a First Amendment not
that protects speech, but instead that prohibits certain reasons for restricting it.").
119. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. Indeed, any such review would be
generated as a matter of equal protection law, not of free speech law, to the extent that the speech
at issue is deemed nonspeech or unprotected speech. To justify a higher level of review, either First
Amendment concerns or a suspect classification would have to be shown. See supra note 81
(discussing levels of review under equal protection law).
120. Steven H. Shiffrin, Racist Speech, OutsiderJurisprudence,andthe MeaningofAmerica,
80 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 56-57, 60-64, 91-93 (1994).
121. Id. at 59, 68-69, 91.
122. Id. at 84-93.
123. Id. at 93-102.
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Court failed to take seriously the competing value of equality in the
case.' 24 For example, one of the arguments made by Guy Charles is that
the Black Court applied its standards in a manner that took the harms of
racism seriously while the R.A. V. Court applied its standards in a manner
dismissive of such harms. 2 5 While such points are important, they take on
greater clarity and significance when they are considered in tandem with
the broader doctrinal framework within which courts consider race-based
speech measures. A virtue of carefully limited unprotected speech
categories is that they provide a framework to consider acceptable bases
for speech regulation. Within this framework, courts can assess whether
and when racism truly manifests itself as unprotected speech and whether,
when, and why such manifestation can be treated differently than other
instances of unprotected speech. Yet if such assessment is to successfully
be made, one must first consider whether unprotected speech is fully
unprotected and if not, what principles and standards shape its parameters.
IV. A NEW APPROACH FOR ASSESSING CONTENT-BASED REGULATIONS
OF UNPROTECTED SPEECH: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

This Part gives substance to the widely shared, but so far inadequately
explained, instinct that there is something constitutionally troubling about
content-based regulations of unprotected speech. This Part explains that
this instinct only reasonably can stem from the relationship between
protected speech and unprotected speech. Subpart A explains the
categorization paradox. The categorization paradox embraces the ideas
that categorization is necessary and desirable but that the very elements
that make speech unprotected also contribute to an inescapably fine line
between unprotected speech and protected, even deeply valued speech.
Given the close relationship between protected speech and unprotected
speech, categorization is best understood as a necessary evil in free speech
doctrine. Subpart B discusses the containment principle. This principle,
which follows from the categorization paradox, encompasses the notion
that the scope and use of unprotected speech categories must be carefully
contained in light of the potential impact of unprotected speech regulations

124. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 98, at 125-26, 151-61; Charles R. Lawrence, III, supra note
48, at 787-804; Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 795,825-28 (1993).
125. Charles, supra note 29, at 602-03, 610-13, 629-32. For reasons explained in my
discussion ofR.A. V. 's doctrinal standards and their application, I disagree with Charles's suggestion
that the R.A. V. Court's conclusion was indefensible. It is true, however, that the R.A. V Court's
language and tone suggested a dismissiveness toward claims grounded in the heightened harms of
racism, even where the Court's doctrine left some opening to assess such harms-an opening which
the Court took in Black. Certainly, the shakiness of R.A. V. 's theoretical foundations and of the
doctrine formulated therein leaves uncertain the likely consistency and merit of any future
determinations that the Court might make regarding similar questions.
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on free speech value and on protected, even deeply valued speech. Subpart
B details the particular risks posed by content-based regulations of
unprotected speech to free speech value and to protected speech. Subparts
C and D explain that the seeds for conceptualizing the categorization
paradox and the containment principle can be gleaned from existing free
speech theory and doctrine. Subpart E explains that social science research
on evaluative heuristics bolsters an important aspect of the argument that
content-based regulations of unprotected speech threaten protected speech.
A. The CategorizationParadox
1. The Categorization Paradox Part I: The Desirability of
Categorization
The categorization paradox encompasses two major points. First,
categorization is a necessary and desirable part of free speech doctrine.
Second, categorization is necessarily problematic because many of the
elements that justify deeming speech unprotected bear a close relationship
to protected, even highly valued speech.
With respect to the first point, a limited categorization doctrine is
consistent with free speech theory to the extent that such doctrine is geared
toward identifying speech that not only generates overwhelming harms,
but that does so in a manner generally antithetical to free speech value.
Indeed, this Article earlier made the descriptive observation that
categorization cases often are based on the notion-sometimes explicit and
sometimes implicit-that harms caused by unprotected speech not only
outweigh any free speech value but also operate in a manner antithetical
to such value.' 26 For example, the recent split by an en banc panel of the
Ninth Circuit over the constitutional definition of "true threats" was
motivated partly by competing conclusions as to when threats circumvent
the preconditions of intrinsic and instrumental free speech theories by
undermining threat recipients' autonomy and ability to respond to the
threats. 27
'
Scholars similarly have argued that particular unprotected speech
categories operate in a manner antithetical to free speech value. For
example, Edwin Baker, among others, has justified certain speech
restrictions, such as those on threats, through an autonomy-based
conception of the First Amendment that deems speech that circumvents

126. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
127. Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1085-86 (9th Cir.
2002); id.at 1088-89 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting); id.at 1098-100 (Kozinski, J., dissenting), 1106-07
(Berzon, J., dissenting).
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listeners' autonomy beyond constitutional protection.'28 Scholars such as
Kent Greenawalt have based similar arguments on both intrinsic and
instrumental theories of free speech value, arguing that threats or other
forms of speech that seek effectively to alter situations through fiat rather
with free speech theory and are not
than persuasion are inconsistent
29
1
protected.
constitutionally
That speech content sometimes creates harms so overwhelming or
antithetical to free speech value as to justify regulation is but a subset of
the larger observation that content-based speech regulation sometimes is
legitimate. These observations raise the question of what doctrinal tools
courts should have at their disposal to distinguish acceptable from
unacceptable content-based regulations. Because the alternative to
categorization is reliance solely on one-size-fits-all balancing tests, the
relatively desirable, speech-protective nature of a limited categorization
doctrine is easy to discern.
Categorization doctrine is relatively speech-protective because of its
conduciveness to the creation and application of fine-tuned standards. Of
course, categorization is no panacea. Debates long have existed over
it makes a difference whether courts
whether and to what extent
"categorize" or "balance."' 3 ° And history suggests that the content of a test
or standard may be less predictive of a case's result than the personal
views that inform the judge's application of the relevant standards.'
Nonetheless, tests to define specific categories of unprotected speech

128. C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 54-65 (1989); see also
Christina E. Wells, ReinvigoratingAutonomy: Freedom andResponsibilityin the Supreme Court's
FirstAmendment Jurisprudence,32 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 159, 161, 165-73, 179-80, 186-96
(1997).
129. See KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS 48-50 (1995); KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH,
CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 57-63,67-68,94-99 (1989).
130. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age ofBalancing,96 YALE
L.J. 943, 943-44, 960-63,966-67 (1987); John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration:A Case Study in the
Roles of CategorizationandBalancingin FirstAmendmentAnalysis,88 HARV.L. REV. 1482, 150003, 1506-08 (1975); Robert F. Nagel, Liberals and Balancing, 63 U. COLO.L. REV. 319, 319-24
(1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-LiberalJudging: The Roles of CategorizationandBalancing,
63 U. COLO.L. REV. 293, 293-96, 306-09 (1992).
131. Compare Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (majority opinion, applying clear
and present danger test to uphold a conviction, by Justice Holmes), with Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (dissenting opinion, arguing that conviction should be overturned
under clear and present danger test, by Justice Holmes). Certainly, Justice Holmes's differing
positions in the two cases could be attributed to differences in the facts. But one also could
conclude that Justice Holmes grew warier of government control of speech in the eight months
between the two opinions and that he therefore applied the same test more leniently in Abrams than
in Schenck. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct, supra note 72, at 1167-68
("Commentators sense that Holmes dramatically shifted his emphasis with his dissent in Abrams
v. United States.").
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logically seem more conducive to identifying narrow conditions on which
a lack of constitutional protection hinges than do generally applicable
balancing tests.'32 History seems to bear this perception out. For example,
while the story of incitement doctrine's development at its core is a story
of a deepening theoretical commitment to open political discourse, such
commitment manifests itself doctrinally in a set of specific standards
defining "inciting" speech. " Similarly, while the definition and propriety
of "fighting words" remain cloudy, there is widespread agreement that the
term's meaning has narrowed considerably over the years, paralleling a
deepened theoretical commitment on the part of the Supreme Court to
unfettered social discourse.' 34
Finally, a limited categorization doctrine serves as a partial defense
against the dilution of generally applicable doctrinal standards. While
categorization doctrine is vulnerable to overly speech-restrictive
implementation, the doctrine has the virtue of forcing open judicial
discussion regarding clearly momentous decisions to deem particular
speech categories unprotected. The alternative, providing the judiciary
with a single set of one-size-fits-all standards, risks the more insidious
judicial disfavoring of particular speech forms through unusually harsh
applications of standard doctrinal tests. Such an alternative also risks
diluting general speech protections as the Court strains to interpret existing
standards in a way that enables it to uphold regulations of disfavored, but
technically protected speech.'35
2. The Categorization Paradox Part II: Categorization as a
Necessary Evil
The same factors that make categorization necessary also make it a
risky and necessarily imperfect endeavor. Paradoxically, the very

132. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 130, at 1500 & n.75; Cass R. Sunstein, Government Controlof
Information, 74 CAL. L. REV. 889, 909 (1986).
133. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). But see Redish, Advocacy of
Unlawful Conduct,supra note 72, at 1175-82 (critiquing ambiguities in the Brandenburgtest and
offering an alternative formulation).
134. See, e.g., Kitrosser, From MarshallMcLuhan to Anthropomorphic Cows, supra note 1,
at 1347 n.36 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); Gard, supra note 33, at 534.
135. See R.A.V. v, City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 403 (1992) (White, J., concurring in the
judgment); id. at 415 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment); Sunstein, supra note 132, at 909;
cf Vincent Blasi, The PathologicalPerspectiveand the FirstAmendment, 85 COLUM. L.REV. 449,
476-80 (1985) (advocating that free speech doctrine be viewed from a "pathological perspective,"
or from the perspective of considering how best to protect free speech in times of crisis when
pressures to censor are particularly strong. From this perspective, Blasi observes "a close
correlation between the ambit of coverage and the ability of courts to keep doctrine simple,
informed by tradition, and dominated by principles.").
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characteristics that can push speech into the realm of the unprotected are
characteristics that might, at a different level of intensity or in a slightly
altered context, be highly valued from the perspective of free speech
theory. Consider the example of incitement doctrine. As noted earlier,
incitement doctrine is so complicated precisely because speech that
intentionally incites imminent illegal activity may involve impassioned
calls to action grounded in social or political views.' 36 Where such
expression is so closely "brigaded with action"' 37 that it intentionally and
imminently incites illegal activity, it crosses a fine line separating
punishable triggers to action from protected, even deeply valued
expression that passionately advocates illegal activity more abstractly.'
Yet the crossing of this line should not obscure the close relationship
between "incitement" and protected, often deeply valued speech.
Similarly, this Article has earlier referred to a recent split within the Ninth
Circuit, en banc, as to the definition of a punishable threat. 39 The
disagreement between the judges in this case was so heated precisely
because the dissenting judges insisted that some speech very close to the
"threats" line-including the speech at issue there-not only falls short of
40
the line but in fact is highly valued for its passionate, vehement nature.
And one need look no further than the trail of obscenity prosecutions
against the late comedian Lenny Bruce to understand that the same
qualities that make speech valueless filth to one observer can make speech
a highly valued rejection of a culture's sacred cows to another observer.141
The categorization paradox thus stems from the fact that categorization,
while a necessary and even speech-protective alternative to one-size-fitsall balancing tests, is necessarily imperfect because of the inescapably fine
line between unprotected speech and protected, even deeply valued
speech. Misjudgments as to how to draw and police this line are inevitable,
as reflected in the shifting of the line over the years. Similarly, it is
disingenuous to suggest that free speech value truly ceases to exist in any
meaningful way the minute that speech is deemed unprotected. The line
between unprotected and protected, even highly valued speech is too fine
and too murky to draw that conclusion.

136. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
137. See Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 456 (Douglas, J., concurring).
138. See, e.g., KALVEN, supra note 72, at 234-36 (explaining the "Brandenburgline").
139. See supra notes 44, 126 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 44, 126 and accompanying text.
141. See generally RONALD K. L. COLuNS & DAVID M. SKOVER, THE TRIALS OF LENNY
fall of the2005
iconic American comedian).
the rise and
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B. The ContainmentPrincipleand the Risks Posed by Content-Based
Regulations of UnprotectedSpeech
The categorization paradox has two consequences. On the one hand, it
is important that courts maintain categorization as a tool for discerning
those rare categories of speech that can be deemed unprotected. If this tool
is to mean anything, it is important that legislatures have substantial
leeway to regulate within these categories. Such categories can be
legislated against in their entirety. In addition, reasonable leeway should
exist for legislatures to legislate within subcategories of these categories.
On the other hand, the categorization paradox tells us that we have to
expect misjudgments, even abuse in the definition and regulation of these
speech categories. Misjudgments by courts are inevitable, both as to which
speech categories should be unprotected and also as to whether and when
speech falls within such categories. Abuse by legislatures and law
enforcement personnel who use such categories to chill or prosecute
protected speech also are inevitable. Thus, some limits on the use of
unprotected speech categories are called for. The limits should be geared
toward minimizing the impact of categorization doctrine on free speech
value in two sets of cases: first, in cases where speech is unprotected but
has significant value and thus reflects a flaw with the unprotected speech
category itself; and second, in cases where categorization serves as a
vehicle to infringe on protected speech.
The content-distinction doctrine is an important tool for containing
these two types of impact. This is because content-based regulations of
unprotected speech are uniquely poised to create such impact. This
Subpart explains how content-based regulations of unprotected speech
threaten to impact free speech value and protected speech.
First, because free speech value cannot reliably be deemed absent from
the realm of unprotected speech, the free speech value-based concerns that
underscore the content-distinction rule are not fully absent from the realm
of unprotected speech.'42 This insight provides the missing link that eludes
the R.A. V.Court. The R.A. V Court begins its analysis by reciting and
embracing the standard justifications for categorization doctrine,
explaining that unprotected speech categories long have been deemed to
have "'such slight social value as [steps] to truth that any benefit that may
be derived from them is clearly outweighed."" 43 After this confident

142. For detailed discussions regarding the concerns underlying the content-distinction in the
realm of protected speech, see sources cited supranote 13. But see generally Martin H. Redish, The
Content-Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981) (criticizing the
content-distinction as unjustifiable even in the realm of protected speech).
143. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss4/2
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assertion, however, the Court leaps to the conclusion that unprotected
speech categories are not, in fact, "invisible to the Constitution.""' As
explained earlier, the Court's conclusion is illogical if the Court continues
to make the assumption, which it purports to make, that free speech value
reliably can be deemed absent or overwhelmingly outweighed in the realm
of unprotected speech. The Court's conclusion makes sense, however, if
one begins with the premise that unprotected speech categories are a
necessary evil-that they are important and valid tools of free speech
doctrine, but that there are reasons not fully to trust the judgments that
they embody. From this perspective, one can proceed reasonably to the
conclusion that the use of categorization must be contained and that
content-distinction principles have some role to play in the realm of
unprotected speech. Specifically, one can understand, from this
perspective, the R.A. V Court's invocation of the standard, free speech
value-based concerns underscoring the content-distinction: intrinsic
concerns with content-based regulation and instrumental concerns about
the skewing effect that such regulation has on the marketplace of ideas.' 45
One can also understand the relevance of a third danger: the risk that
legislatures more readily will suppress speech when they can hone in
solely on unpopular speech content."4 Taken together, these concerns
suggest the following risk posed by content-based regulations of
unprotected speech: Such regulations make it too easy for legislatures to
hone in on particularly unpopular unprotected speech, thus skewing public
discourse, causing intrinsic harms to speakers and causing intrinsic social
harms borne of legislative bad faith.
Of course, the containment principle takes us well beyond the insight
that content-distinction principles have a role to play in the realm of
unprotected speech. The bolder insight to which the containment principle
lends itself is the insight that unprotected speech categories have an impact
on their close cousin: protected speech. In particular, content-based
regulations of unprotected speech pose three major risks to protected
speech.
The first such risk stems from the long-acknowledged chilling effect
that unprotected speech has on protected speech. As discussed further in
Subpart D, existing doctrine manifests a limited understanding of the
relationship between protected speech and unprotected speech, although
this understanding rarely impacts inquiries beyond those concerning the
definitions of unprotected speech categories. Nonetheless, this
understanding gives rise to widespread acknowledgement of the chilling
effect, or the risk that unprotected speech categories will inhibit more
144. Id.
145. See id. at 383-90; see also sources cited supranote 13.
13, at 608-11.
SeeUF
Brownstein,
supranote
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speech than they technically prohibit because speakers fearful of
punishment will err on the side of caution.'47 This risk exacerbates the
problems posed by content-based regulations of unprotected speech. To
the extent that content-based regulations of unprotected speech may chill
protected speech, any such chilling effect will be distributed in an uneven,
content-based manner. Because such an effect operates within the realm
of protected speech, the standard, free speech value-based concerns
underscoring the content-distinction rule are raised.'48
The second risk to protected speech is that content-based regulations
of unprotected speech will use unprotected speech as a vehicle to punish
persons for protected speech that accompanies but that does not form part
of the unprotected speech. This danger is reflected in the following
hypothetical example drawn by the R.A. V. Court itself:"149 a statute
regulating "threats against the President that mention his policy on aid to
inner cities."' 50 Were a speaker to say "I am going to kill the President if
he does not alter his policy on aid to inner cities," there is a strong
argument to the effect that every element of the statement is part of a
threat. The reference to inner-city aid policy constitutes the very
contingency of the threat. On the other hand, imagine the following
hypothetical rant by a caller to a radio talk show:
I hate the President. Somebody should kill him. Hell, I'll kill
him. That's right. Tell his secret service guards to watch their
man's back, because I'm going to get him. It's about time that
somebody did. I mean, look at our international policy. Look
at our domestic policy. My god, look at the President's policy
on aid to inner cities. That's right, somebody's going to get
him soon. And that somebody will be me.
While this rant likely includes a punishable threat,"' it is far less clear
that the rant's reference to inner city aid policy is part of the threat. To the
contrary, the reference seems part of a protected, verbal backdrop of anger
147. See supra note 20.
148. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (citing sources discussing the standard
justifications for the content-distinction rule).
149. The R.A. V.Court interprets this hypothetical statute as regulating only unprotected speech
but as doing so in a constitutionally problematic manner. See R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 388. In actuality,
the hypothetical statute should be understood to pose a risk to protected speech, as explained herein.
150. Id.at 388.
151. Cf United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1020-22, 1025, 1028 (2d Cir. 1976)
(upholding a conviction on the ground that a televised statement promising to kill Yassir Arafat
while he visited the United States was a "true threat"). But see Planned Parenthood v. Am.
Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1097-99 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J.,dissenting)
(arguing that speech that is publicly addressed and political in nature is very unlikely to constitute
a "true threat"); id.at 1101-02, 1104-06 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (same).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss4/2
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and heated rhetoric, accompanying but not constituting part of the threat.
This example demonstrates the risk that legislators will use content-based
regulations of unprotected speech to punish protected speech by
heightening punishment for (or conditioning punishment of unprotected
speech on) protected speech that is likely to accompany, but not to form
part of, unprotected speech.'
A similar danger is reflected in the "freedom of thought" argument
mentioned earlier.'53 As noted earlier, it is not necessarily problematic for
legislatures to target thought as it manifests itself in unprotected speech.'54
For example, to the extent that racism is clearly manifest in the
conveyance of a threat and clearly heightens the threatening nature of the
speech, it likely can be punished. On the other hand, to the extent that
one's use of unprotected speech triggers the punishment of unexpressed
racist thoughts or expressed racist thoughts unrelated to the unprotected
speech at issue, then the racism or other content element at issue serves as
a vehicle to punish protected speech or thought.
The third major risk to protected speech is that content-based
regulations of unprotected speech will serve as heuristic devices, hinting
to speakers and factfinders that the thin line between protected and
unprotected speech is crossed where a targeted content element is present.
The statute at issue in Virginia v. Black,'55 a case discussed in more detail
in Part V, exemplifies this risk. The Black statute prohibited threats
conveyed through cross-burning.'56 Given the relative salience of the
cross-burning factor and the relative murkiness of identifying and applying
the elements of a protected threat,' such a statute bears a risk that the

152. Other examples abound, particularly given the likelihood that heated political or social
rhetoric will accompany some speech that could be classified as threatening speech, inciting speech
or fighting words. See, e.g., supranote 151 (citing Kelner andPlannedParenthood).While Kelner
involved general threats statutes, see 534 F.2d at 1020, it calls to mind the possibility of a
hypothetical statute punishing "threats to a foreign politician that mention the politician's position
on Palestinian statehood." PlannedParenthoodinvolvedthe subject-specific statute ofthe Freedom
of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE) regulating threats of force against persons based on their
provision of reproductive health care services. PlannedParenthood,290 F.3d at 1062. Planned
Parenthood did not, however, involve an R.A. V-style challenge to FACE's subject matter
specificity. Such challenges to FACE are discussed in Brownstein, supra note 13, at 558-84, 63638.
153. See supranote 82 and accompanying text.
154. See supranotes 82-84 and accompanying text.
155. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
156. Id. at 347-48.
157. See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705,707-08 (1969) (discussing the debate over
the meaning of"true threats"); PlannedParenthood,290 F.3d at 1086; id. at 1088-89 (Reinhardt,
J., dissenting) (arguing over the definition of a "true threat"); id.at 1099-1100 (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting) (same); Rothman, supra note 76,at 286-89
dissenting) (same); id. at 1107 (Berzon, J.,
(discussing
among courts
over the definition
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cross-burning factor will create a perception on the part of speakers,
factfinders and law enforcement agents that cross-burning is prohibited per
se or that it is so likely to be punished that it categorically must not be
engaged in. Indeed, in the facts underlying Black, a sheriff told Black that
he was being arrested because "'there's a law in the State of Virginia that
you cannot bum a cross."' 15 8 While this statement could have been
motivated by another element of the Virginia statute making cross-burning
prima facie evidence of a threat, it seems likely that the mere existence of
a "threatening cross-burning" statute also could give rise to such
statements and arrests. Indeed, Justice Souter, partly dissenting in Black,
lent highly refreshing insight to the case with a statement to the effect that
the Virginia statute might constitute a "subtle effort to
ban.., even... nonthreatening cross burning." '5 9 Justice Souter's point was
160
tied partly to his analysis of the statute's prima facie evidence provision.
Nonetheless, the notion that the judgment of speakers, factfinders, and law
enforcement officers could be skewed toward chilling, conviction, or
prosecution by a statutory cross-burning factor or a similar content-based
provision is entirely plausible, regardless of whether such provision is
accompanied by a prima facie evidence provision.
C. Theoretical Supportfor the CategorizationParadox,for the
ContainmentPrinciple,andfor Conceptualizingthe Risks
Posed to ProtectedSpeech
Underlying the categorization paradox and the containment principle
is a fundamental understanding of human fallibility and a consequent
distrust of government speech regulation. Such distrust is consistent with
the basic suspicion of government competence and trustworthiness in the
realm of speech regulation that runs through all major theories of free
speech value. In the realm of intrinsic free speech theory, for example,
Martin Redish's claim that the only true free speech value is selfrealization' 6 ' logically must rest in part on an assumption about the
untrustworthiness of government speech regulation. This is exemplified by
Redish's emphasis on the importance of free speech for facilitating
listeners' self-realization. Responding to Edwin Baker's argument that
commercial speech constitutionally can be regulated because it stems from
a profit motive and does not further speakers' self-realization, Redish
explains that this argument "fail[s] to acknowledge that individuals may
develop their personal and intellectual faculties by receiving, as well as by

158. Black, 538 U.S. at 349.
159. Id. at 384 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
160. Id. at 385-87 (Souter, J.,
161. Redish, Value of Free Speech, supra note 1, at 594.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss4/2
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expressing. ' While Redish's argument responds effectively to the point
that some speech does not further speakers' self-realization, it does not
respond effectively to the point that some speech poses a conflict between
the self-realization of speakers and that of listeners. Racist speech, for
example, might further speakers' self-realization at the same time as it
stunts listeners' self-realization by making some feel fearful, unwelcome
in their community, or disempowered from speaking freely. Redish's
argument is much more forceful, however, if it rests in part on a distrust
of government's ability to decide which speech will and will not further
self-realization. From such an assumption, it follows that a system of free
speech, while imperfect, is the best and safest route for facilitating the selfrealization of all.'63 Indeed, in a subsequent article, Redish and Howard
Wasserman argue that government distrust or "negative" speech theory
complements such "positive" theories as self-realization theory, with
"negative theories act[ing] as a bodyguard for the positive theories.""
Similarly, the marketplace of ideas theory, which epitomizes an
instrumental approach to free speech theory, rests largely on the premises
that "persons are fallible and thus should never be trusted formally to
declare truth and to close off all debate on a matter," and that the
1 65
"tendency to abuse power in the realm of free speech is quite natural."
While marketplace of ideas theory also rests on optimistic assumptions
about the ability of persons to reason and to "discover truth" once speech

162. Id. at 620.
163. Redish's self-realization theory also can be understood to rely indirectly on distrust of
government insofar as Redish grounds his theory in basic democratic principles. Specifically,
Redish argues that democracy is designed to foster individual self-realization rather than to foster
democracy for its own sake, and that democratic principles thus demand that individuals be left free
to disseminate and consume speech on all matters impacting their development. Id. at 601 -11. To
the extent that concepts of democracy and self-government themselves rest in large part on a
distrust of concentrated government power, so too is Redish's theory grounded partly in this
distrust. See Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy in the ImmigrationCourts andBeyond:Consideringthe Right
to Know in the Administrative State, 39 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 95, 128 n. 183 (2004) [hereinafter
Kitrosser, Secrecy in the Immigration Courts].
164. Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What's Good for General Motors:
CorporateSpeech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 235, 244 (1998).
Redish and Wasserman continue: "In other words, the purpose of the negative theories is to assure
that the positive benefits fostered by the commitment to free expression can be attained, free from
undermining by hostile external forces." Id. Of course, one might argue that negative theory does
a greater than even share of the heavy lifting in its relationship with positive theory, given the
importance of the government distrust assumption to the conclusion that positive theory's benefits
are more likely to be realized by letting speech flow freely rather than by letting government decide
when such benefits will be realized.
165. Kitrosser, Secrecy in the ImmigrationCourts,supranote 163, at 128 (citing JOHN STUART
MILL, On Liberty, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN STUART MILL 185, 205, 208-18 (Marshall Cohen
ed., 1961)by(1859)).
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UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2005

37

Florida Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAW RE VIEW

[Vol. 57

is permitted to flow freely,"6 these assumptions are accompanied by
cautionary assumptions about government's desire to stunt the free flow
of speech and the incompetence of government
to base this stunting on
61 7
reliable conceptions of "truth" or "falsehood."'
The work of Frederick Schauer highlights the reliance of traditional
free speech theories on distrust of government's ability to draw nonabusive
distinctions between speech that should be suppressed and speech that
should be protected. Schauer argues that negative justifications, or
justifications based on distrust of government decisionmaking, not only are
common components of major instrumental and intrinsic theories of free
speech value, but also constitute the most sensible part of these theories.'68
Schauer concludes that "the most persuasive argument for a Free Speech
Principle is what may be characterized as the argument from governmental
incompetence."169
Finally, viewing critical race and gender-based theories of speech
suppression through the lens of government distrust illuminates a major
contradiction in such theories while also illuminating how such a
contradiction may be reconciled with the theories' useful insights. Most of
the critical race and gender literature that advocates suppressing racist or
misogynistic speech is grounded in a belief in a deeply racist and sexist
social, legal, and political structure.170 On the one hand, such grounding is

166. Id.
167. Id.; SCHAUER, supra note 43, at 33-34. More modem theories of free speech, too,
generally are grounded in some optimistic assumptions about human nature coupled with
pessimistic assumptions about the reliability of government to regulate speech responsibly. Lee
Bollinger's theory that free speech cultivates a characteristic of tolerance among social actors rests
on the twin premises that persons have a capacity for profound intolerance that can manifest itself
through majority rule, and that speech represents an area in which enforced tolerance can maximize
human tendencies toward reasoned understanding. LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY
107-44 (1986). Another example is found in Steven Shiffrin's theory that the First Amendment
should be understood in large part as a mechanism to celebrate, cultivate, and protect a spirit of
dissent and nonconformity among persons. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT,
DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 5-8, 86-109, 140-69 (1990). Shiffrin's theory is grounded in the twin
premises that there is a strong human tendency toward conformity and toward the enforcement of
imperfectly realized or imperfectly understood "truths," see id. at 92-95, and that a freedom of
dissent helps stem tendencies toward totalitarianism and intellectual stagnation through the embrace
of both reasoned deliberation and aromantic spirit of nonconformity. See id.
at 91-96, 142, 159-61.
168. SCHAUER, supra note 43, at 33-34, 45, 70-72.
169. Id.at86.
170. See Kitrosser,FromMarshallMcLuhan to Anthropomorphic Cows, supranote 1, at 1383
& nn.232-33 (citing RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS? HATE
SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT 43, 83, 85, 86 (1997); CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, Francis Biddle's Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED 146-49, 154-55,174, 178(1987); Charles R. Lawrence, III, IfHe HollersLet Him Go:
RegulatingRacist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431,461; Mari J.Matsuda, PublicResponse
to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim 's Story, in WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE38
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss4/2
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suggestive of the profound harms that such speech can cause. On the other
hand, such grounding suggests that the government is particularly likely
to be inept or abusive in purporting to regulate racist or sexist speech or
thought, as the government itself is both product and perpetuator of the
social framework identified by critical theorists.17 ' The insights of critical
theorists thus do not undermine theoretical support for the categorization
paradox, the containment principle, or fears that government will abuse the
power to regulate speech. Rather, such insights significantly bolster these
points. Yet the containment principle, when considered in tandem with
categorization doctrine, suggests a way that free speech doctrine can
embrace critical race and gender theories' useful insights while rejecting
their contradictions. Specifically, free speech doctrine can deem contentbased regulations of unprotected speech legitimate outlets to punish the
harms of racism or sexism to the extent that such racism or sexism
genuinely manifests itself in unprotected speech and heightens the harms
thereof. Indeed, the insights of critical theory can help shed light on when
and how racism or sexism heightens the harms of unprotected speech.'72
At the same time, free speech doctrine can respond to the dangers implicit
in such regulations by filtering them through standards designed to ensure
that they do not infringe on protected speech or otherwise unduly impact
free speech value.
D. DoctrinalSupportfor the CategorizationParadox,for the
ContainmentPrinciple,andfor Conceptualizingthe
Risks to ProtectedSpeech
Seeds of support for the categorization paradox, the containment
principle, and the risk that legislatures will harness unprotected speech
categories to encroach on protected speech also can be derived from
existing doctrine. Perhaps the most obvious source of such support is the
Supreme Court's emphasis on the risk of a chilling effect from defamation
law.' 73 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,'74 the Court famously held that
false criticism of public officials' official conduct is not punishable as
defamation unless the claimant can prove that "the statement was made
with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."' 75 The New York Times
Court stressed the fine line between highly valued, vigorous criticism of
20, 23-24 (Robert W. Gordon &
Jane Radin eds., 1993)).
See Kitrosser, supra note 1, at 1384-85, 1385 n.237.
See Charles, supra note 29, at 628-32.
Many thanks to Marty Redish for suggesting the example of defamation law.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Id. at 279-80.

THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Margaret
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
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public officials and false, defamatory statements about such officials.1 76
Given this fine line, the Court noted that a less stringent rule would
intolerably chill nondefamatory speech, as
would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from
voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true
and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it
can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do
so. They tend to make only statements which "steer far wider
of the unlawful zone.'
A stringent rule is necessary, in short, 78to give protected speech the
"'breathing space' necessary to survive.
The Supreme Court also has coupled its observation that unprotected
speech must be defined strictly to prevent encroachment on protected
speech with the observation that even expressions of official disapproval
of speech can chill the dissemination and consumption of such speech.
These combined concerns form the basis of the decision in Bantam Books,
Inc. v. Sullivan,'79 in which the Court deemed unconstitutional the
practices of Rhode Island's "Commission to Encourage Morality in
Youth."' 8 ° Such practices included the Commission notifying book
distributors when the Commission deemed certain books or magazines
"objectionable for sale, distribution or display" to minors. 8 ' Although
refusal to cooperate with the Commission technically violated no law, the
Court found that the Commission "deliberately set about to achieve the
suppression of publications deemed 'objectionable' and succeeded in its
aim" through various means, including by following written requests for
cooperation with visits from law enforcement officers inquiring as to the
steps that distributors had taken toward cooperation.8 2 Noting that the
Commission did not direct its pressure solely toward obscene works, 83 the
Court stressed the fine line between protected and unprotected speech and
the need to police that line vigorously.8 4 Citing free speech's vulnerability
to "gravely damaging yet barely visible encroachments," the Court
explained that its "insistence that regulations of obscenity scrupulously
embody the most rigorous procedural safeguards... is... but a special

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 271-73.
Id. at 279 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
Id. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,433 (1963)).
372 U.S. 58 (1963).
Id.at 59.
Id.at61.
Id. at 62-64, 66-68.
Id.at 64.
Id.at 65-66.
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instance of the larger principle that freedoms of expression must be ringed
about with adequate bulwarks." '8 5 The Court went on to explain that even
non-binding suggestions of official disapproval can chill protected
speech. "8 6
Of course, there are important differences between the facts of New
York Times, Bantam Books, and cases such as R.A. V. and Black. And the
Court has refused to extend the Bantam Books principle itself very far,
holding, twenty-six years after Bantam Books, that the federal
government's practice of labeling selected foreign films as "propaganda"
and requiring such films to fulfill certain registration, filing, and disclosure
requirements does not unconstitutionally restrain speech.1 87 Nonetheless,
Bantam Books and New York Times reflect doctrinal seeds of support for
the categorization paradox and the containment principle. Both cases
reflect a general wariness by the Court of categorization doctrine's power
and a resulting recognition by the Court that unprotected speech categories
must be carefully confined, lest they encroach on protected speech.
Furthermore, Bantam Books reflects a concern that official actions that do
not directly constrain protected speech-but that hint at the illegality of
such speech-can encroach on protected speech in a manner more
dangerous than direct regulation. 88
E. Support in Social Sciencefor Recognizing a Risk Posed by ContentBased Regulations of UnprotectedSpeech to ProtectedSpeech
Social science research on evaluative heuristics bolsters an important
aspect of the argument that content-based regulations of unprotected
speech threaten protected speech. Specifically, such research bolsters the
argument that such regulations can serve as heuristic devices, suggesting
to speakers, factfinders, and others that speech merely close to the
unprotected line crosses the line where a targeted content element is
present. The point is not that social science support is a necessary
component of a free speech argument or that the insights of social science
trump the assumptions of free speech theory.' 89 The point, rather, is that
the insights of social science help to confirm and explain the common

185. Id. at 66.
186. Id. at 66-70.
187. See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 484-85 (1987).
188. See Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 69-70.
189. Indeed, one might argue that the assumptions about human nature made in free speech
theory are not always intended to be descriptively accurate so much as they are intended to reflect
an ideal that must be assumed for other reasons, such as a commitment to human dignity or a fear
of the oppressive and paternalistic government that might result from different assumptions. Cf
supra Part IV.C (arguing that a fear of government abuse and incompetence underscores all major
theories of free speech value).
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sense intuition, already consistent with free speech theory and doctrine,
that content-based regulations of unprotected speech can serve as heuristic
devices that threaten protected speech. 190
Social science research on evaluative heuristics suggests that
individuals subconsciously adopt decision making shortcuts to compensate
for limited time, knowledge, and analytical skills.' 9 ' While it is not
inherently illogical to rely on proxies to identify factors that generally
correlate with such proxies, individuals may choose their proxies poorly
and thus may make mistakes in assuming that certain factors indicate the
existence of other factors. Heuristics literature identifies common mistakes
that individuals make in treating the existence of certain factors as proxies
for the existence of other factors.
The heuristic most relevant to this Article's argument is the "anchoring
heuristic," whereby individuals tend to tailor their answers to questions so
that the answers bear a close relationship to facts that they are given, even
where it is clear that the facts have no relationship to the questions. Paul
Horwitz explains a classic anchoring experiment and basic conclusions
drawn from the experiment:
Consider this experiment, conducted by Tversky and
Kahneman. A set of subjects was confronted with a wheel of
fortune, which was spun and landed on sixty-five. They were
first asked whether the percentage of African countries in the
U.N. was more or less than sixty-five percent, and then what
the exact percentage was. These respondents gave a median
estimate of forty-five percent. Another set of subjects was
faced with a wheel of fortune that landed on ten. They gave
a median estimate of twenty-five percent. This example
illustrates the phenomenon of anchoring and adjustment:
individuals who are asked to estimate a number often
"anchor" on an original starting value, and then fail to adjust
sufficiently up or down from this original starting point. This
is true even when the anchor is arbitrarily chosen, or is
outrageously extreme. Juries deliberating on damage awards
may center on an "anchor" figure, thus skewing the damage
determination toward that number, even if it is too low or
high. 192

190. Cf Paul Horwitz, Free Speech as Risk Analysis: Heuristics, Biases, and Institutionsin
the FirstAmendment, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 1,8 (2003) (by viewing free speech law through the lens
of behavioral science, we can understand how the law reflects recognition of "predictable
shortcomings in our ability to perform accurate risk analysis").
191. Id. at 12; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski. The Uncertain PsychologicalCasefor Paternalism,97
Nw. U. L. REv. 1165, 1165-66 (2003).
192. Horwitz, supra note 190, at 18-19.
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Similarly, as Bill Eskridge and John Ferejohn explain, anchoring research
suggests that factfinders may "latch[] onto the most emotionally salient
factor [in a case] as an anchor, which [they then] adjust[] by other factors,
rather than [deem] trumped by these factors."' 93
Anchoring research bolsters this Article's argument that content-based
regulations of unprotected speech may serve as heuristic devices,
suggesting to speakers, factfinders, and law enforcement officials that
speech merely close to the unprotected line crosses the line where a
targeted content element is present. Consider again the example of threats
"'
Determining whether something
conveyed through cross-burning. 94
constitutes a threat is a murky and complicated task, particularly given the
often fine line between unprotected speech and protected, even deeply
valued, speech. 95 Determining whether someone has burned a cross,
however, is a fairly straightforward matter. Given the relative simplicity
and emotional salience of the latter determination, there is a risk that
factfinders will anchor their assessment of the former in an affirmative
determination of the latter, at least in close cases. Furthermore, there is a
greater risk that heuristic skewing will occur outside of the factfinding
context, given the absence of procedural safeguards and intensive
deliberation outside of that context. For example, as the facts underlying
Black suggest, law enforcement officials and speakers may focus on the
most salient aspect of a statute concerning threats conveyed through crossburning to conclude that cross-burning generally is prohibited. 196
Of course, the existence of cross-burning or other content elements
could prove emotionally salient for factfmders even in cases prosecuted
under general statutes. For example, factfinders may punish cross-burners
for the ideological message conveyed by cross-burning by deeming their
speech threatening under a general threats statute. This type of risk is not
fully avoidable, although it can be reduced through judicial protections
such as jury instructions and standards for evidentiary admissibility.
Content-based statutes, however, add additional risks to the mix. Such
statutes threaten to serve as legislative hints to the effect that a targeted
content element's presence is a proxy for unprotected speech. Such
statutes also give factf'mders, speakers, and law enforcement officials
statutory elements on which to anchor ideological biases or fears of
prosecution.
Finally, one may argue that an anchoring effect is perfectly appropriate
as many content elements correlate with unprotected speech and its ill

193. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, StructuringLawmaking to Reduce Cognitive
Bias: A Critical View, 87 CoRNELL L. REv. 616, 635 (2002).
194. See supra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
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effects. One may argue, for example, that cross-burning tends to correlate
with threatmaking in light of cross-buming's history and salience.' 97 This
point merits two responses. First, the fact that a content factor often
correlates with an unprotected speech category is not a reason to
encourage use of the former as a proxy for the latter. Indeed, free speech
theory and doctrine suggest that one must remain highly wary of
guesswork and imprecision in the realm of free speech law. Second, while
wariness toward content-based regulations of unprotected speech is
appropriate, such regulations are not categorically unconstitutional. Part
V discusses the doctrinal standards that should be developed to balance
wariness toward content-based regulations of unprotected speech against
interests in permitting such regulations.
V. DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS: A CRITIQUE OF CURRENT DOCTRINE
AND A PRESCRIPTION FOR NEW DOCTRINE

Part V considers the doctrinal implications of the theoretical analysis
already undertaken. Subpart A explains the doctrinal standards that should
apply to content-based regulations of unprotected speech. Subpart B
contrasts Subpart A's approach with the doctrinal standards drawn by the
R.A. V. Court, explaining that the R.A. V. standards are imprecise fits for
containment-based concerns.
A. The Right DoctrinalStandards
Doctrinal standards to assess content-based regulations of unprotected
speech must account for two factors. First, they must account for the
virtues of categorization doctrine by according legislatures a fair amount
of leeway to regulate unprotected speech categories. Second, to the extent
that the standards tie legislatures' hands, they must do so in a manner
responsive to the dangers that such regulations pose to free speech value
and to protected speech.
From this perspective, two doctrinal standards seem appropriate. The
first standard assesses the relationship between the content-based
regulation and the harms targeted by the larger, unprotected speech
category at issue. This standard should ask whether a content-based
regulation of unprotected speech is substantially related to a state interest
that constitutes a particularly compelling subset of the very reason the
entire class of unprotected speech is proscribable. As Subpart B explains,
this standard is similar to one of the several doctrinal standards invoked by
the R.A. V. Court; indeed, it is similar to the only one of the Court's
standards that approaches a reasoned response to containment-based

197. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 353-57 (2003).
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concerns. Yet as also discussed in Subpart B, the Court's version of this
standard suffers from flaws that stem from the shakiness of the underlying
theoretical foundations. Additionally, the Court's version of the standard
is accompanied by a host of other standards that range from the
superfluous to the affirmatively damaging. These differences are not only
of theoretical import, but also have important practical consequences as
illuminated in Part VI.
For now, it suffices to note that the standard suggested above strikes a
balance between protecting free speech value and giving legislatures
leeway to regulate subcategories of unprotected speech where justified.
The standard protects free speech value in two ways. First, it accounts for
the existence of free speech value within the realm of unprotected speech
and the consequent dangers posed by content-based regulations by
demanding that legislatures have compelling, nonsuperfluous reasons for
content-based regulations. The compelling nature of the interest demanded
is built into the standard. And superfluity is guarded against by demanding
that the interest at issue be a particularly compelling subset, not a mere
mirror image, of the reason why the larger speech category is regulated in
the first place. Legislatures thus could not enact content-based regulations
that target the precise harms already targeted by larger, unprotected speech
categories. Furthermore, by demanding a "substantial relationship" to the
harms, the standard guards against mere assertion or post hoc justification
by demanding evidence that the content-based subcategory at issue raises
real and uniquely pressing harms that were considered by the legislature.
Second, the standard protects free speech value by minimizing the risk of
protected speech infringement. Specifically, the standard serves as a
"back-up check" of sorts against the risk that protected speech will be
targeted or impacted' by assessing whether the harms targeted by the
regulation are of the same nature as the harms targeted by the larger
unprotected speech category. Finally, the standard strikes a balance
between protecting free speech value and according legislatures leeway to
regulate within categories of unprotected speech. Indeed, legislatures
maintain substantial regulatory leeway that they do not possess in the
realm of protected speech. To the extent that the harms that give rise to
larger unprotected speech categories correlate with particular types of
content, legislatures have leeway to create content-based regulations.
In addition to this standard, courts should consider more broadly
whether protected speech is threatened in a manner that cannot be
accounted for through a detailed standard. For example, in Black, as
explained below, the Virginia statute not only prohibited threats conveyed
198. Such check is a "back-up check" in the sense that it ought to accompany, but of course
not replace, any checks as to whether protected speech facially is infringed through a vague or
overbroad regulation.
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through cross-burning, but also made the fact of cross-burning prima facie
evidence of a threat.' 99 A court should recognize that the prima facie
evidence provision suggests a desire to use the fact of cross-burning as a
heuristic tool to indicate the presence of a threat and should invalidate the
entire legislation as suspect in such a case.2"'
B. R.A.V. and Black: Descriptionand Critiqueof Existing Doctrine
1. R.A.V
In R.A. V., the Court outlined a confusing series of standards that reflect
the shakiness of their theoretical foundations. 20 ' First, the Court explained
that content-based regulations of unprotected speech, like content-based
2°2
regulations of protected speech, can survive if they pass strict scrutiny.
Yet without acknowledging that it is doing so, the Court effectively applies
a much harsher version of strict scrutiny to the St. Paul ordinance than that
which it typically applies to content-based regulations of protected
speech. 203 In assessing content-based regulations of protected speech, the
Court typically asks whether the regulation is narrowly tailored or is the
2°4
least restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest.
While the Court sometimes frames the inquiry by asking whether the
regulation is a necessary means of achieving a compelling government
interest, 205 the necessity inquiry typically focuses on the narrowness of the
regulation. That is, the necessity inquiry typically focuses on whether the
regulation is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling
government interest. 20 6 In contrast, the R.A.V. Court interprets the
necessity inquiry to mean that a regulation will not be upheld if a broader,
noncontent-based alternative will suffice. 2 07 The St. Paul ordinance fails
to pass muster under this standard, because, the Court explains, a content-

199. See infra notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
200. See infra notes 262-65 and accompanying text.
201. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-90 (1992).
202. Id. at 395-96.
203. See id. at 403-05 (White, J., concurring).
204. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (citing
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115, 126 (1989)).
205. See, e.g., R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 395 (citing Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992)
(plurality opinion); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
206. E.g., Burson, 504 U.S. at 199-200,206-08 (plurality opinion); see also Eberle, supranote
99, at 1162.
207. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 403-06 (White, J., concurring); Eberle, supra note 99, at 1144-45,
1161-63.
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neutral prohibition of all fighting words would have sufficed to prohibit
the particular fighting words singled out by the ordinance.20 8
The problem with the Court's use of what Edward J. Eberle calls
heightened strict scrutiny2°9 is that it seems effectively insurmountable and
thus does no doctrinal work, making it at best superfluous and at worst a
misleading rhetorical tool. The standard seems insurmountable because a
content-neutral regulation of an entire category of unprotected speech by
definition would eliminate the speech that a narrower regulation would
eliminate. This is why the R.A. V. Court concludes that the St. Paul
ordinance fails strict scrutiny, and the same would seem to be true of any
content-based regulation of unprotected speech. If the standard does no
doctrinal work, then at best it is a superfluous distraction. At worst, the
standard is a misleading rhetorical tool, falsely bolstering the Court's
"case" against a regulation that fails the Court's other, problem-fraught
standards.
If the heightened strict scrutiny standard does no real doctrinal work,
then any real doctrinal lifting is left to the R.A. V Court's "exceptions" to
its general rule against content-based regulations of unprotected speech.21°
Specifically, the R.A. V Court explains that some content-based regulations
simply pose no risk that "official suppression of ideas is afoot., 211 It
outlines two specific exceptions in which no such risk exists, but also
leaves a catch-all exception for any situation in which courts find that no
such risk exists.212 The catch-all exception is impossibly vague and
underprotective of speech, leaving the door open for the Court to allow
any regulation that strikes it as acceptable. The R.A. V Court found that the
St. Paul ordinance did not pass muster under this catch-all exception,
partly because it did not pass muster under the Court's more specific
exceptions and partly because the Court detected a viewpoint basis in the
ordinance.213
As for the Court's more specific exceptions, one is for regulations that
facially target speech content but that do so for purposes relating to the
"secondary effects" of such speech, rather than to communicative or
expressive aspects of the speech.214 Secondary effects doctrine, itself a
208. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 395-96.
209. Eberle, supra note 99, at 1163, 1166.
210. See R.A.V. 505 U.S. at 382-84.
211. Id. at 390.
212. Id. at 387-90.
213. Id.at 395.
214. Id.
at 389; see also Kitrosser,From MarshallMcLuhan to AnthropomorphicCows, supra
note 1, at 1397 (discussing secondary effects doctrine). The "secondary effects" exception also is
applied by the Court in the context of content-based regulations of protected speech, and the
exception has been the subject of much judicial and scholarly commentary in that context. See, e.g.,
1397-98,
1398 n.280.
id., at 1341
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deeply controversial area of free speech law, constitutes an exception to
the presumption against content-based regulations where facially contentbased regulations are underscored by a legislative purpose to prevent
secondary effects, such as crime or violence, correlated with particular
types of speech.215 Although the R.A. V. Court deems this exception
inapplicable to the St. Paul ordinance," 6 the Court's use of this exception
is troubling for the same reason that it is troubling when it applies to
protected speech. In the protected speech context, secondary effects
doctrine is deeply controversial because a purported legislative wish to
target the secondary effects of speech constitutes far too easy an excuse for
otherwise impermissibly content-based regulation and because secondary
effects are notoriously difficult to distinguish from primary emotive or
communicative effects of speech.2" 7 In the context of unprotected speech,
the fact that legislatures might purportedly wish to target secondary effects
does not suffice to cure containment-based concerns regarding seemingly
superfluous or otherwise suspicious legislation.218

215. See Kitrosser,From MarshallMcLuhan to AnthropomorphicCows, supranote 1, at 1341
n.10, 1397-98; see also infra note 218 (discussing the R.A. V. Court's odd interpretation of
secondary effects doctrine).
216. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 394. The Court explains that St. Paul deems the impact of fighting
words on particularly vulnerable persons to constitute a secondary effect and that such impact in
fact constitutes an emotive, or primary impact of fighting words. Id. The Court further explains that,
had St. Paul argued that the particular fighting words at issue are more likely than other fighting
words to provoke violent confrontations, such an argument, too, would rely on the words' emotive,
primary impact on listeners, rather than on violence that simply happens to correlate with particular
fighting words. Id. at 394 n.7.
217. Kitrosser, From MarshallMcLuhan to AnthropomorphicCows, supranote 1,at 1397-98,
1398 n.280.
218. It also is worth noting that the Court's description of secondary effects doctrine is
inconsistent with its articulation of that doctrine elsewhere and that this inconsistency likely is
grounded in a desire to avoid the farthest reaching implications ofR.A. V.'s general rule. As already
noted, secondary effects doctrine typically allows facially content-based regulations to be treated
as content-neutral when they are intended to target ill effects that happen to correlate with particular
types of speech. See supranote 215 and accompanying text. As an example of secondary effects
doctrine's application, however, the R.A. V. Court refers to words that are "swept up incidentally
within the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather than speech," such as "sexually derogatory
'fighting words"' that "may produce a violation of Title VII's general prohibition against sexual
discrimination in employment practices." Id. at 389. As Justice White (concurring with three other
Justices in R.A. V) suggests, a content-based regulation of speech grounded in a purpose to prevent
secondary effects is very different from a noncontent-based regulation targeting conduct that
happens incidentally to include protected or unprotected speech. Id. at 409-11, 409 n. 11 (White,
J., concurring in the judgment). While the R.A. V Court may well be correct that the latter is
nonsuspect for any number of reasons, secondary effects doctrine is not one of those reasons. This
aspect of the Court's opinion is noteworthy because, as the R.A. V. concurrence points out, it reflects
some doctrinal flailing by the R.A. V. Court in its apparent effort to avoid the farthest reaching
implications of its expansive general rule. Id. at 409 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss4/2
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The Court's more important exception-more important because it is
a potentially large loophole and because it is similar to this Article's
proposed standard-is its exception for situations in which "the basis for
the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire
class of speech at issue is proscribable." 2 9 The Court explains that:
[s]uch a reason, having been adjudged neutral enough to
support exclusion of the entire class of speech from First
Amendment protection, is also neutral enough to form the
basis of distinction within the class. To illustrate: .... [T]he
Federal Government can criminalize only those threats of
violence that are directed against the President, since the
reasons why threats of violence are outside the First
Amendment (protecting individuals from the fear of violence,
from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the
possibility that the threatened violence will occur) have
special force when applied to the person of the
President. . . . But the Federal Government may not
criminalize only those threats against the President that
mention his policy on aid to inner cities.220
The Court explains that the St. Paul ordinance does not fall within this
exception. 22 ' The Court says that fighting words are unprotected because
they constitute a "particularly intolerable (and socially unnecessary) mode
of expressi[on]," and that St. Paul has not singled out only fighting words
that involve "an especially offensive mode of expression," but "has
that communicate messages
proscribed fighting words of whatever manner
222
of racial, gender, or religious intolerance.
To the extent that this standard attempts to link the means and ends of
content-based regulations of unprotected speech to those of general
regulations of unprotected speech, it might suggest a subtextual,
containment-based concern on the Court's part. At the very least, it might
suggest a concern with ensuring that only unprotected speech is targeted
or impacted by such regulations. Not surprisingly, however, the murkiness
of any containment-based concerns on the Court's part gives rise to serious
problems in the Court's articulation and use of this standard.
There are two major problems with the Court's version of this
exception, both as articulated and as applied. As articulated by the Court,
the exception leaves open the possibility of regulations that are too

219. Id. at 388; see also id. at 408 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that this
"exception swallows the majority's rule").
220. Id. at 388 (citation omitted).
221. Id. at 391.
222. by
Id.UF
at 393-94.
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superfluous to justify their risk to free speech value and to protected
speech. The exception, on its face, allows for content-based subcategories
of unprotected speech that respond to the precise harm already embraced
by larger unprotected speech categories. Furthermore, even assuming that
the exception is applied only to regulations targeting harms of the same
nature as, but more compelling than, those targeted by the larger
unprotected speech category, 223 the exception remains problematic because
it demands no particular degree of fit between the regulation and the
purported harms.
Perhaps most problematic is that the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the exception in R.A. V. (and again in Black, as we shall see) 224 betrays
uncertainty as to whether "the very reason [for proscribability]" refers to
the harms targeted by the unprotected speech category or to some other
characteristic shared by all speech within the category. 225 Such confusion,
again, is not surprising in light of the tenuous justifications in which the
exception is grounded in the first place. In R.A. V., the Court adopts an
interpretation that seems to hinge more on the nature of fighting words
than on the harm that fighting words purport to target, explaining that
fighting words constitute a "particularly intolerable (and socially
unnecessary) mode of expressi[on]" and that the St. Paul ordinance does
not single out fighting words expressed in a particularly offensive mode,
but singles out fighting words reflecting particular topics or viewpoints. 26
Lost in this discussion is any serious consideration of whether the St. Paul
ordinance adopts its content-distinction because the fighting words
embraced by the distinction are particularly likely to cause immediate
breaches of the peace or otherwise to cause the harms associated with
fighting words. 2 7 As we shall see in Part VI, this has troubling
implications for the types of regulations that the Court might be willing to
uphold, particularly in the fighting words context.
Finally, the R.A. V. Court suggests that the St. Paul ordinance might be
viewpoint-based, or at least might have a viewpoint-specific impact, and
that this adds to its inherently suspicious nature.228 While the implications
of this observation-an observation with which other members of the
Court vehemently disagree 2 2 9-are left vague, the observation seems to

223. See infra text accompanying notes 244-45,259 (explaining that the Court's application
of this exception in Black is largely consistent with the "more compelling interest" interpretation
of it).
224. See infra Part V.B.2.
225. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 388.
226. Id. at 393-94.
227. Id.
228. See id. at 391-92.
229. Id. at 433-35 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss4/2
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color the Court's application of its standards. Indeed, the Court's
questionable application of its "reason for proscribability" exception
seems grounded partly in the Court's distaste for the fact that the
ordinance, in the Court's view, singles out particular viewpoints.23 ° The
problem with the Court's emphasis on viewpoint-basis is that it is not well
tailored to containment-based concerns. Because unprotected speech is
unique in that its harms necessarily stem from speech content, it is not
surprising that elements of speech content not normally
proscribable-including viewpoint-may sometimes heighten the harms
of the unprotected speech. Viewpoint elements thus might, at least in rare
cases, justify content-based regulation of unprotected speech categories.
On the other hand, content-based regulations based on subject matter or
communicative symbols can pose substantial threats to free speech value
that will not always prove justified by the requisite harms. The R.A. V.
Court's fixation with viewpoint-basis thus threatens both to overprotect
and to underprotect with respect to future regulations. Furthermore, it often
is not clear whether a regulation is viewpoint-based, subject matter based,
or based on communicative symbols or communicative impact. This is
evidenced by the division within the R.A. V.Court as to whether the St.
Paul ordinance indeed was viewpoint-based.23 ' Such uncertainty,
combined with the malleability of the R.A. V standards, poses a risk that
the Court will draw decisive conclusions about viewpoint-basis grounded
in little more than a gut feeling about a regulation.
2. Black
This Subpart briefly sketches the facts of Virginia v. Black.2 32 It then
describes relevant parts of the Black Court's doctrinal analysis and
critiques this analysis.
Two separate incidents gave rise to Virginia v. Black.2 33 The first
involved a Ku Klux Klan rally in which a twenty-five to thirty foot cross
was burned. 234 The rally and cross-burning were held on private property
adjacent to a state highway with the property owner's permission. 235 The
rally and cross-burning were witnessed by a number of passerbys from the
highway, including a sheriff.236 After witnessing the cross-burning, the
sheriff informed the rally's leader, Barry Black, that "'there's a law in the
230. See infra text accompanying note 232.
231. See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text; cf. sources cited supra note 10
(discussing the difficulties in defining "content").
232. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
233. Id. at 348-50.
234. Id. at 349.
235. Id. at 348.
236. by
Id.UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
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State of Virginia that you cannot bum a cross"' and arrested him.23 7 The
second incident occurred when three men, including Richard Elliot and
Jonathan O'Mara, burned a cross on the lawn of James Jubilee, an AfricanAmerican man who recently had moved next door to Elliot. 238 The three
men claimed to have burned the cross in order to "'get back' at Jubilee for
complaining" to Elliot's mother about shots that Elliot fired in Elliot's
backyard.239
Black, Elliot, and O'Mara each were charged with and convicted of
violating a Virginia statute that provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent
of intimidating any person or group of persons, to burn, or
cause to be burned, a cross on the property of another, a
highway or other public place....
Any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence
of an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons. 24
Black, Elliot and O'Mara each challenged the statute as facially
unconstitutional. 24 ' The Virginia Supreme Court held in their favor,
deeming the statute "'analytically indistinguishable from the ordinance
found unconstitutional in R.A. V. "' because it punishes a content-based
subcategory of threats.242 The Virginia Supreme Court also held that the
"prima facie evidence provision renders the statute overbroad because
'[t]he enhanced probability of prosecution under the statute chills the
expression of protected speech.' "243
The Supreme Court agreed that the statute is a content-based regulation
of unprotected threats and that the principles of R.A. V apply, but held that
the statute falls within R.A. V's exception for situations in which "'the
basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the
entire class of speech at issue is proscribable."' 2" The Black Court
concluded that Virginia may
outlaw cross bumings done with the intent to intimidate
because burning a cross is a particularly virulent form of
intimidation. Instead ofprohibiting all intimidating messages,
Virginia may choose to regulate this subset of intimidating

237. Id. at 349.
238. Id. at 350.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 348 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (Michie 1996)).
241. Id. at 351.
242. Id. (quoting Black v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738, 742 (Va. 2001)).
243. Id. (quoting Black, 553 S.E.2d at 746).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss4/2
244. Id. at 361 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)).
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messages in light of cross burning's long and pernicious
history as a signal of impending violence.
The Court also emphasized that the regulation is not viewpoint- or subjectmatter-based as it makes no difference under the statute whether speech is
directed toward a "disfavored topic[]" and as "it is not true that cross
burners direct their intimidating conduct solely to racial or religious
'
minorities."246
The Supreme Court did, however, deem the statute's prima facie
evidence provision unconstitutional. 247 The Court construed the prima
facie evidence provision to mean that "' [t]he burning of a cross, by itself,
is sufficient evidence from which [factfinders] may infer the required
intent [to threaten].' 248 The Court explained that the provision, so
construed, creates a risk that cross-burning not intended to threaten and
thus constitutionally protected will be punished.249 Such punishment can
occur where a defendant does not put on a defense and thus offers nothing
to overcome the inference of intent to threaten.25 Such punishment also
can occur where, in close cases, factfinders treat the statutory inference as
decisive. 25 ' The provision thus makes the statute overbroad, in the Court's
apparent view.252
The Black Court's opinion includes a lengthy discussion of the history
of cross-burning in the United States and of cross-burning's association
with the Ku Klux Klan in particular.25 3 The Court explains that a crossburning can have one or both of two meanings. First, a cross-burning can
be deeply expressive, albeit in a volatile and hurtful way, about prejudice
or other divisive issues. 254 Second, a cross-burning can have the intent and

245. Id.at 363.
246. Id.at 362. The Black Court seems, in short, to deem the Virginia statute content-based
by relying on a definition of "content" meaning the communicative manner or mode of expression,
rather than viewpoint or subject matter. See, e.g., Kitrosser, From Marshall McLuhan to
Anthropomorphic Cows, supranote 1, at 1341-42 (defining communicative manner).
247. Black, 538 U.S. at 367.
248. Id. at 364. The Court based its interpretation on a Virginia state jury instruction. Id.
(quoting jury instruction provided in Barry Black's case, which Black Court explains is the same
as the Virginia Model Jury Instructions, Criminal, Instruction No. 10.250 (1998 and Supp. 2001)).
249. Id.at 366-67.
250. Id.at 365.
251. Id.at 366 (implying-though not stating explicitly-that the statute is overbroad); see
also id.at 373 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part) ("In deeming § 18.2-423 facially invalid, the plurality presumably means to rely on some
species of overbreadth doctrine.").
252. Id. at 364-67.
253. Id.at 352-57.
254. by
Id.
at 357.
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effect of placing persons in fear for their lives or physical safety.25 5 The
history and strength of the second meaning leads the Court to conclude
that a cross-burning intended to intimidate constitutes a "particularly
virulent form of intimidation," justifying an exception to R.A. V.'s general
rule.256 The existence of the first meaning leads the Court to conclude that
each cross-burning must be examined separately for evidence of intent to
threaten, lest a presumption of intent skew factfinder deliberations toward
punishment in cases involving speech that not only is protected, but that
'
constitutes "core political speech."257
The Black opinion reflects three major problems with existing doctrine.
First, while the Black Court applies the "very reason [for proscribability]"
exception... in a manner more appropriate than that of the R.A. V. Court,
the contrast between the standard's application in the two cases highlights
its troubling malleability. While the Black Court treats the standard as
requiring statutes to target harms of the same nature but more compelling
than those targeted by the larger unprotected speech category,25 9 the
standard continues, on its face, to leave room for statutes to target harms
of the precise nature as those targeted by the larger unprotected speech
category. More disturbing, the Black Court does nothing to reconcile its
use of the standard with the R.A. V Court's use of the same, leaving room
for the Court to continue, in future cases, to use the standard to assess the
nature of speech characteristics, rather than the harms targeted. This has
troubling implications, as exemplified by the hypothetical fact pattern
discussed in Part VI.D.
Second, the Black Court's emphasis on its perception that the statute
is not viewpoint-based raises problems similar to those raised by the
R.A. V Court's emphasis on its perception that the St. Paul ordinance is
viewpoint-based.26 Assuming that it is easy to discern when a statute is
based on viewpoint rather than subject matter or communicative symbol,
the implication that the Court might apply its (already malleable) standards
with less rigor in the latter cases is troubling. This is particularly so when
one considers that the lines between the various types of contentdistinctions are not so easy to discern, as reflected by a dispute between
the Justices in Black as to whether the statute truly is viewpoint-neutral. 26 '

255. Id.
256. Id. at 363.
257. Id.at 365.
258. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
259. Supra notes 244-45 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 228-31 and accompanying text.
concurring in the
261. Compare Black, 538 U.S. at 361-62, with id. at 383-84 (Souter, J.,
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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Third, the Black Court's treatment of the prima facie evidence
provision, while a step in the right direction, suggests that the Court does
not fully grasp the nature of the heuristic skewing risk posed by contentbased regulations of unprotected speech. The question does not hinge, as
the majority implies and partial dissenters assume, on whether the statute
is facially overbroad as a result of the prima facie evidence provision.262
Of course, facial overbreadth is an important factor to consider. However,
even where a statute is not overbroad in that it only targets unprotected
speech on its face, a risk of heuristic skewing can remain and a prima facie
evidence provision can remain suspicious from this perspective.
Furthermore, as noted above26 3 and explained further below,2 " the nature
of a heuristic skewing risk is such that the prima facie evidence provision
the entire statute, not just the prima
should have led the Court to invalidate
2 65
itself.
by
provision
evidence
facie
VI. SOME THOUGHTS ON APPLICATION: APPLYING THIS ARTICLE'S
STANDARDS TO THE FACTS OF R.A. V AND BLACK AND TO TWO
HYPOTHETICAL STATUTES

Subparts A and B apply this Article's standards to the provisions at
issue in R.A. V. and Black. While the result reached in R.A. V would likely
have been the same under this Article's approach and the result in Black
would have been partly the same, there would have been significant
differences in rationale with important consequences for future cases.
These consequences are reflected in the comparative application of this
Article's standards and the R.A. V Court's standards to two hypothetical
statutes discussed in Subparts C and D.

262. See Black, 538 U.S. at 366; id. at 371-73 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
263. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
264. See infra note 286 and accompanying text.
265. See Black, 538 U.S. at 386 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part). Justice Souter stated,
[t]he question here is not the permissible scope of an arguably overbroad statute,
but the claim of a clearly content-based statute to an exception from the general
prohibition of content-based proscriptions, an exception that is not warranted if
the statute's terms show that suppression of ideas may be afoot. Accordingly, the
way to look at the prima facie evidence provision is to consider it for any
indication of what is afoot.
Id. (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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A. R.A.V. Revisited
Assuming arguendo that the St. Paul ordinance at issue in R.A. V was
not facially overbroad,2" the regulation should have been struck down in
light of the failure of St. Paul's justifications to demonstrate that the
ordinance was "substantially related to a government interest that
constitutes a particularly compelling subset of the very reason the entire
class of unprotected speech is proscribable. 267 Judging by St. Paul's brief
to the U.S. Supreme Court and by the Minnesota Supreme Court's opinion,
the ordinance appears to have been justified by a loose mix of factors, but
primarily by the notion that the speech targeted conveys a message of
group hatred and that "[i]t is the responsibility, even the obligation, of
diverse communities to confront such notions in whatever form they
appear. 26 8 The most obvious problem with this goal is that it does not
relate directly to the purposes underlying fighting words provisions
generally. While there is some dispute as to the definition of fighting
words,269 a fairly clear meaning of the term is that it refers at least to those
words "reasonably considered direct personal insults likely to invite
physical confrontation,"2 7 and that it thus is linked to an interest in
stopping imminent breaches of the peace.27' A desire to send an antigroup-hatred message simply does not constitute a "more compelling
subset" of this interest.
While St. Paul's brief refers at points to the particularly deep-seated
and sustained fears to which cross-burning gives rise in members of racial

266. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text; infra note 277 and accompanying text.
267. See supra Part V.A (proposing this standard).
268. In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 508 (Minn. 1991); see also Brief for
Respondent at 7, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (No. 90-7675). Respondent's
Brief further stated
there is a need for specific enactments to deal with the use of symbols of racial,
religious, ethnic or other group hatred. Otherwise, there is a danger that minority
groups will not understand that this aspect of the behavior they have experienced
is not condoned by the majority. This is a lesson the majority also must understand
and openly acknowledge.
Id.at 25.
269. This dispute is hardly advanced by the R.A. V. Court's insistence on relying, at least
arguendo, on the Minnesota Supreme Court's "limiting construction" of the St. Paul ordinance,
which itself seems to exceed the modem definition of fighting words by stating that "the ordinance
censors only those displays that one knows or should know will create anger, alarm or resentment
based on racial, ethnic, gender or religious bias." Welfare of R.A. V., 464 N.W.2d at 510; see also
R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 381 (deferring to the state court's construction). But see Shiffrin, supra note
120, at 72-73 (defending state court's construction).
270. See supra notes 33, 135 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 33, 135 and accompanying text.
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minority groups,27 2 this interest, too, fails to justify St. Paul's ordinance
upon close analysis. First, the interest is presented largely as an
afterthought to the goal of making a statement against group hatred and
even is conflated at points with an interest in suppressing protected speech.
Indeed, St. Paul's brief at one point discusses the anti-fear interest
interchangeably with an interest in countering all racial insults and
epithets.273 More convincing evidence of an anti-fear interest unconnected
to a desire to suppress protected speech is necessary to prove a substantial
relationship between such interest and the regulation. Second, St. Paul's
references to cross-burning and race-based fears have little bearing on the
facial validity of the statute as a whole given the statute's emphasis on
gender and religion, as well as race, and given the statute's application to
swastikas and other "symbol[s], object[s], appellation[s],
characterization[s and] graffiti. ' 274 If a "substantial relationship" between
means and ends is demanded to guard against purposeful or inadvertent
infringement on protected speech, then a justification underlying one
prong of a multi-pronged statute cannot suffice to justify the statute as a
whole. Finally, while an interest in stemming particularly sustained and
deep-seated fears may constitute a more compelling subset of an interest
directed toward stemming fear generally, fear-reduction is not properly
conceptualized as an interest underscoring fighting words doctrine. While
there is controversy over the scope of fighting words doctrine, as already
noted, and while early case law provides a basis for argument to the effect
that fighting words include words that cause fear and other deep-seated
emotional harms, 275 recent case law strongly suggests that fighting words
encompass only those words that threaten an imminent breach of the
peace.276 Assuming, then, that fighting words encompass only speech
causing imminent peace breaches, an interest in stemming fear-based
harms simply does not constitute a "more compelling subset" of the
interest underscoring fighting words doctrine.
These concerns are compounded by the ordinance's questionable
breadth. While the R.A. V Court avoided deciding whether the ordinance
was facially overbroad, it is relevant, from a containment-based
perspective, that the content-based ordinance accompanied a vague and
272. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent at 26 n.5, 36 n.5, 38-41, R.A. V.(No. 90-7675) (citing
testimony of the fears cross-burning generates in the African-American community).
273. Id. at 37-40; cf id.at 19 (suggesting that cross-burning generally has little or no speech
value and thus can readily be punished). The anti-fear interest's status as an apparent afterthought
also is reflected in the fact that some of the Briefs most compelling references to the interest are
conveyed entirely through footnotes. See id. at 26 n.5, 36 n.5.
274. R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 380.
275. See Gard, supranote 33, at 531-34 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571-72 (1942)).
276. See supranote 134 and accompanying text.
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facially broad description of fighting words. Such accompaniment bolsters
the concern that St. Paul sought to use fighting words doctrine as a legal
hook to punish protected racist speech.277
While this Article's approach leads to the same result reached by the
R.A. V Court, the underlying rationale to which the approach lends itself
stands on much firmer theoretical footing and offers sounder doctrinal
guidance than does the rationale offered by the R.A. V Court. This
Article's approach involves application of a more rigid and more carefully
justified version of the "reason for proscribability" standard, as detailed
above.278 Additionally, peripheral inquiries that may unduly restrain
legislatures where their provisions are deemed viewpoint-based or that
may underprotect speech by too readily permitting provisions based on
communicative mode are avoided. Furthermore, this Article's approach,
which joins the "more compelling subset" question to a "substantial
relationship" requirement but does not pretend that standard strict scrutiny
is relevant to the inquiry, avoids the difficulties faced by the R.A. V Court
as it struggled to explain why the St. Paul ordinance could not meet strict
scrutiny."'
B. Black Revisited
Thus, while St. Paul's ordinance fails to pass muster under this
Article's doctrinal approach, both the approach and St. Paul's discussion
of the unique, race-based fears caused by cross-burning lend themselves
to a principled explanation for the result in Virginia v. Black to the extent
that the Virginia statute's general prohibition is considered apart from its
prima facie evidence provision. As St. Paul's analysis, Virginia's analysis
in its briefs to the Supreme Court in Black, and the Supreme Court's
discussion in Black suggest, there is much evidence to the effect that crossburning creates paralyzing fear and intimidation of a uniquely sustained
and deep-seated nature.28° The evidence suggests both that cross-burning
may more readily create fears than do other threats and also that the fears
caused themselves are uniquely profound.281 Thus, a statute directed
toward threatening cross-burnings may well pass muster as being

277. See R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 411-15 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (deeming the St.
Paul ordinance overbroad).
278. See supra Part V.A.
279. See supra Part V.B.1.
280. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 352-59 (2003) (describing the intimidation
created by Klan cross-burnings); Brief of Petitioner at 29, 33-37, Virginia v. Black, 53 U.S. 343
(2003) (No. 01-1107) (describing society's understanding of cross-burning); Brief for Respondent
at 26 n.5, 36 n.5, 38-4 1, R.A. V. (No. 90-7675) (highlighting the historical association of crossburning with violence).
281. Brief for Respondent at 26 n.5, 36 n.5, 38-41, R.A. V (No. 90-7675).
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substantially related to a more compelling 282
subset of the interests deemed
to underscore threats provisions generally.
Removing the prima facie evidence provision from the picture, then,
and assuming that this Article's approach would lead to the same result as
that reached in Black, the approach would involve an important difference
in rationale. Specifically, the result would be grounded solely in the
relationship between the state interests underscoring threat provisions
generally and the interests underscoring the cross-burning threats provision
at issue. So long as the latter constitute a more compelling subset of the
former and relate substantially to the statute at issue, the provision can be
deemed a legitimate unprotected speech provision rather than a threat to
protected speech. Irrelevant to this inquiry are attempts to discern whether
the state interests are based on viewpoint, subject matter, or
communicative mode. The danger that such attempts will diminish
protection for symbolic speech by minimizing the significance of
infringements thereupon is exemplified by Virginia's brief, which
repeatedly argues that the relevant provision is not content-based at all
because it merely targets one communicative mode of expression. 283 And
the confusion and disingenuousness to which such attempts lend
themselves is exemplified by the Black Court's attempts to make clear that
the fears caused by threatening cross-burnings are not unique to particular
racial or religious groups,284 presumably because such uniqueness might
signal a statutory viewpoint or subject matter basis.285
Finally, under the containment-based scrutiny required under this
Article's approach, much greater attention should be paid to the relevance
of the Virginia statute's prima facie evidence provision to the soundness
of the statute as a whole. As Justice Souter indicates in partial dissent, the
prima facie evidence provision suggests that the statute, if not as initially
created then as maintained, is intended at least partly to "skew jury

282. See, e.g., Rothman, supra note 76, at 285 (discussing policies behind threats doctrine).
283. Brief of Petitioner at 11-21, Black (No. 01-1107).
284. See Black, 538 U.S. at 352-56, 362 (listing examples of cross-burning used to target
various racial, religious, and labor groups).
285. A description of cross-burning as causing uniquely paralyzing harms for particularly
vulnerable groups is fully consistent with the conclusion that threatening cross-burnings cause a
more compelling subset of the harms caused by threats generally. Nonetheless, the Black Court
seemed to make an effort to distance itself from this conclusion. See id.at 365-67. Professor
Richard Delgado, commenting in the New York Times after the oral argument in Black, cited the
strained content-neutrality arguments made by the statute's proponents as a basis for criticizing the
content-distinction generally. Adam Liptak, Justice Thomas's Stand; Symbols and Free Speech,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2002, § 4 (Week in Review), at 5 (quoting Professor Delgado as follows:
"'Burning crosses are expressions of bigotry associated with racism in the South,' ... and that
message is precisely why they should be banned. The requirement of content neutrality is.. . 'a
mechanistic test' that dishonors history and reality").
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deliberations toward conviction in cases where the evidence of intent to
intimidate is relatively weak and arguably consistent with a solely
'
ideological reason for burning."286
This conclusion, and consequent
invalidation of the entire statute, is appropriate from a containment-based
perspective.
C. A HypotheticalRace-Based Threats Statute
The practical, significance of this Article's approach is exemplified by
comparing how a hypothetical statute punishing race-based threats might
fare under this Article's approach with the statute's likely fate under the
R.A. V. Court's approach. It is very likely that such a statute would pass
muster under this Article's approach. If Virginia could demonstrate that
threats that evince race-based motivation have a history of inspiring
particularly great fear and paralysis because of the unique likelihood that
they will be carried out and that such concerns motivated the state
legislature, such a statute likely would pass muster under a containmentbased approach. Under the Supreme Court's approach, however, the result
would be far less clear. On one hand, the Court might interpret its "reason
for proscribability" exception287 in a manner consistent with that just
described. On the other hand, the Court might repeat three facets of its
performance in R.A. V.to strike the statute down. First, it might rely on the
statute's arguably viewpoint-based nature8 8 to deem it unconstitutional.
Second, the Court could rely on the malleability of its "reason for
proscribability" exception and apply the exception to assess something
other than the targeted harms. The Court could thus conclude that the
statute does not fall within the exception. The Court likely would combine
this discussion with an emphasis on the statute's viewpoint-basis, much as
the Court did in R.A. V.2 9 Third, the Court could bolster its analysis
rhetorically by invoking other doctrinal elements, particularly the heavy
hand of heightened strict scrutiny.

286. Black, 538 U.S. at 383-85 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
287. See supra notes 219-27 and accompanying text.
288. It is not at all clear that this hypothetical statute is viewpoint-based rather than subjectmatter-based or communicative-impact-based. However, the debate between the R.A. V. Justices as
to the nature of the St. Paul ordinance, see supranotes 228-31 and accompanying text, suggests that
there would be judicial debate, at the very least, as to the nature of this hypothetical statute.
Compare R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) ("In its practical operation,
moreover, the ordinance goes even beyond mere content discrimination, to actual viewpoint
discrimination."), with id. at 433 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Significantly, the St.
Paul ordinance regulates speech not on the basis of its subject matter or the viewpoint expressed,
but rather on the basis of the harm the speech causes.").
289. See supra notes 228-31 and accompanying text.
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D. A Hypothetical Fighting Words Statute
Just as the Court could rely on its doctrine's malleability to strike down
a race-based threats statute, so the Court could rely upon such malleability
to uphold statutes that would be struck down under a containment-based
approach. One suggestive example is a hypothetical statute punishing
fighting words that involve profane language. Under a containment-based
approach, such a statute likely would be struck down for at least one of
two reasons. First, while it would not be surprising to learn that profanity
is one of many factors sometimes encompassed in fighting words, it seems
unlikely that profanity would have a provably heightened tendency to
create or exacerbate physical fights above and beyond the tendencies of
fighting words generally to have such effect. Second, from a perspective
focused on the relationship between the harms of the larger unprotected
speech category and the harms of the content-based subcategory thereof,
it is possible that fighting words are categorically unlikely to be amenable
to constitutional, content-based subcategorization. It is the very nature of
fighting words that they are exceptional compared to merely provocative
or upsetting language, rising effectively to the level of face-to-face
invitations to fight. Thus, it would be uniquely difficult for subcategories
of fighting words to rise beyond this already exceptional level of discourse
to constitute words that are particularly likely to spark fights or to spark
particularly bloody fights. In any event, whether based on a case-specific
application of this Article's standard or a more categorical assessment of
this Article's standard in relation to fighting words, it seems highly likely
that this hypothetical statute would be struck down under a containmentbased approach.
There is a good chance, however, that this hypothetical statute would
be upheld under the R.A. V doctrine. First, the last time that the Court
applied its "reason for proscribability" exception in the context of fighting
words-namely, in the R.A. V. case-the Court deemed the relevant
question whether the subcategory at issue constitutes a "particularly
intolerable (and socially unnecessary) mode of expressi[on]."29' It is
entirely plausible that the Court would deem profane fighting words a
"particularly intolerable (and socially unnecessary) mode of
expressi[on]." 29 ' Second, this hypothetical statute would give the Court
290. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
291. The Supreme Court's treatment ofprofane language has not been entirely consistent over
the years. Compare, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 15-17 (1971) (invalidating
misdemeanor conviction for wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" in a courthouse
corridor), with FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,729-33,750 (1978) (upholding FCC fine for
radio broadcast of George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue and explaining that the FCC may
require radio stations to channel "indecent" broadcasts to times when children are unlikely to be
in the listening audience). Nonetheless, the Court has evinced relative deference toward profanity
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another opportunity to invoke its relative lack of suspicion of contentbased regulations that are based on communicative symbol, manner, or
mode rather than viewpoint. This point could be of independent
significance or of rhetorical assistance in bolstering a lenient application
of its standards. In either case, the Court's approaches in R.A. V. and Black
suggest a likelihood that the Court would uphold this hypothetical statute.
VII. CONCLUSION

While the Supreme Court surely is "onto something" in its instinctive
suspicion of content-based regulations of unprotected speech, precedent
suffers badly for the Court's failure to grasp the nature of that
"something." The venture is not, however, unsalvageable. Should the
Court acknowledge containment-based concerns as the basis for suspicion
over content-based regulations of unprotected speech, the Court could
breathe new life into this area of the law.
Identifying the categorization paradox and the containment principle
as the analytical cores of an approach to content-based regulations of
unprotected speech is important on theoretical, doctrinal, and practical
levels. As a theoretical matter, the precedent as it currently stands evinces
inattentiveness at best and misunderstanding at worst of the value and
implications of categorization doctrine and the relationship between that
doctrine and content-distinction principles. As a doctrinal matter, such
theoretical difficulties naturally translate into problems in formulating
standards.
On a practical level, adjusting the theory and doctrine of the "R.A. V
problem" to conform to the containment principle is highly significant,
even in cases where it is not outcome-determinative. In such cases,
problematic theory and doctrine shape precedent for future cases, future
litigation strategies, and future legislative drafting. Furthermore, to the
extent that the case law seems confused or disingenuous, there is the cost
of diminished public faith in the judiciary. Moreover, replacing the theory
and doctrine of R.A. V with a containment-based approach often will be
outcome-determinative, as the hypothetical statutes in Part VI
demonstrate.
In short, the doctrine and theory of content-based regulations of
unprotected speech are as significant as they are confounding. Embracing
the containment principle by no means solves all problems, as difficult

and indecency regulations that are fairly narrow in nature (e.g., that narrow their scope by requiring
only time channeling). Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 750. This point, combined with the R.A. V.
Court's dicta suggesting a favorable view of restrictions on "particularly intolerable" fighting
words, see supra notes 221-22, 226 and accompanying text, suggests that a "profane fighting
words" regulation likely would be upheld.
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questions of application remain. Such embrace is, however, an important
step toward a coherent approach to the problem. Such embrace also has
broader potential to facilitate understanding of the worth and the dangers
of categorization doctrine and the need to keep such doctrine vibrant
within its domain, but carefully contained.
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